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From the Editor...
Welcome to the Fall/ Winter, 2011 issue of the Journal of Transportation Management!
This issue of the Journal contains five articles on various aspects of trucking safety legal issues, 
logistics strategy impacts across three cultures, LTL pricing, and airline concentration and aviation 
fuel efficiency. The first article is a legal commentary that focuses on the state of safety related legal 
affairs in the motor carrier industry, and specifically examines the “duty of reasonable care” doctrine 
in light of FMCSA’s administration of CSA. The article goes on to make several recommendations 
for shippers and policymakers. The second article examines logistics strategy’s impact on 
coordination, customer serv ice and competitive responsiveness across companies in three distinct 
countries. The article concludes that the Bowersox/Daugherty typology under study is a useful 
approach to examining logistics strategics in different countries.
The third article focuses on LTL pricing and reports on the findings from in-depth interviews of 
industry stakeholders on the topic of satisfaction with current LTL pricing approaches. The article 
confirms a long held dislike for the current class rate system, finds strong support for changing the 
system, and suggests that a density based system is the most likely alternative. The fourth and fifth 
articles relate to the aviation industry. The fourth article reports on passenger airline concentration 
levels and summarizes increasing levels of concentration since deregulation. The article goes on to 
report on evidence of industry economies of scale and discusses the implications of such economies. 
The final article examines the role that fuel efficiency can play in providing competitive advantage in 
the aviation industry. The article concludes that competitive advantage can be particularly powerful 
if a culture of fuel efficiency can be embedded in the organization.
At the Journal, we are continuing to make a number of changes that will improve the visibility of 
JTM, and improve its position in the supply chain publishing world. These include registering and 
updating journal information with several publishing guides, placing the journal eontent with the 
EBSCO, Gale and JSTOR databases faculty have access to, and plaeing abstracts of all past journal 
articles on an open area of the Delta Nu Alpha Journal web page. We are in the process of uploading 
all past issues to these various sites. Full journal article PDF’s continue to be available to 
subscribers on the web page at www.deltanualpha.org with the password: dnadcducation.
I look forward to hearing from you our readers with questions, comments and article submissions. 
The submission guidelines are included at the end of this issue’s articles and I encourage both 
academics and practitioners to consider submitting an article to the Journal. Also included in this 
Issue is a subscription form and 1 hope you will subscribe personally, and/or encourage your libraries 
to subscribe.
John C. Taylor, Ph D.
Editor, Journal of Transportation Management 
Chairman, Department of Marketing and 
Supply Chain Management 
School of Business Administration 
Wayne State University

A COMMENTARY:
THE PERFECT STORM: SCHRAMM DECISION, FMCSA, AND AN IMPOSIBLE DUTY 
FOR BROKERS AND THIRD PARTY LOGISTICS COMPANIES
Paul Stewart 
Attorney at Law
ABSTRACT
Over the last thirty years, there never has been a more confused doctrine than the current “duty of 
reasonable care” faced by transportation brokers, third-party logistics companies and shippers as they 
select carriers for transport. The confusion in what was once reasonable and well understood law has 
been fueled by a perfect storm of judicial reasoning with misplaced reference to faulty empirical 
data, the complete failure of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to properly 
assess carrier safety worthiness, a feeding frenzy by the plaintiffs’ bar and apathy by many in the 
industry. The purpose of this commentary is to examine how this uncertainty developed, to identify 
some of the more glaring issues that must be addressed, and to give some possible guidance as to 
how the industry, FMCSA and courts should proceed to clarify the duty of a broker in complying
with “reasonable care” in selecting carriers.
INTRODUCTION
During thirty years as a transportation attorney, 
general counsel to three third-party logistics 
companies and former CEO of a logistics 
company, there never has been a more confused 
doctrine than the current “duty of reasonable 
care” faced by transportation brokers, third-party 
logistics companies and shippers as they select 
carriers for transport. The confusion in what 
was once reasonable and well understood law 
has been fueled by a perfect storm of judicial 
reasoning with misplaced reference to faulty 
empirical data, the complete failure of the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) to properly assess carrier safety 
worthiness, a feeding frenzy by the plaintiffs’ bar 
and apathy by many in the industry in the face of 
some potentially serious challenges to the future 
of competition in both the carrier and broker 
sectors of the industry.
The purpose of this commentary is to examine 
how this uncertainty developed, to identify some 
of the more glaring issues that must be 
addressed, and to give some possible guidance 
as to how the industry, FMCSA and courts 
should proceed to clarify the duty of a broker in 
complying with the “reasonable care” standard 
for selecting carriers.
Since the inception of the property broker 
concept, brokers have for the most part been 
held to a very limited duty of reasonable care 
and diligent inquiry in the selection of carriers 
for transport. As will be shown, the wisdom of 
fifty years of state and federal courts construing 
this duty to be limited is much more well- 
founded than the more recent and patently 
unsound extensions of this duty, requiring 
brokers to be an ombudsman of safety 
determinations in lieu of the FMCSA.1 *For all of 
the twentieth century a broker’s duty with slight 
exception was usually construed to mean that
1 SeeChubb Group of Insurance Companies v. H.A. Transportation Systems, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal.
2002); CGU Int 7 Ins., PTC v. Keystone Lines Corp. , 2004 WL 1047982. *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2004); Schramm v. 
Foster, 341 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2004); Jones v. C lI. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 2d 630.
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brokers had to confirm that carriers they hired 
satisfied the following requirements:
1. Authorized by what is now the FMCSA;
2. Had regulatory mandated minimum 
insurance coverage; and
3. Were competent insofar as any knowledge 
the broker had or with reasonable care could 
ascertain.2
Perhaps the Foster case' in 1969 was the first 
real inroad into a broader duty by brokers. It 
was clearly a precedent for some of the very 
vague, ambiguous and judicial activist reasoning 
and extremely poor direction by the Maryland 
district court in the Schramm case. The Schramm 
case, and its mandate that brokers/third party 
logistics companies must look to a data base 
(FMCSA’s Safety Status Measurement System, 
“SafeStat”) that was full of error, and invalid as 
a predictor of carrier safety worthiness, pivoted 
off of Foster. It required that brokers look to a 
source that could only create continued 
confusion for brokers and shippers, since both 
the SafeStat system and its successor, Safety 
Management System (SMS), have been shown 
to provide misleading and incomplete 
information from which it is virtually impossible 
to determine carrier safety worthiness, as will be 
more thoroughly discussed herin.
If one is to properly address the current enigma 
faced by brokers in their “new’' duty of 
reasonable care in selecting carriers, decision­
makers must understand how the fallacy of this 
new duty was developed, with some hope that a 
better understanding of this unfortunate rule of 
law will be completely corrected.
ANALYSIS
I. The Foster Case and 1 low it Was Bad Law
and a Faulty Foundation for Schramm
The Foster case involved a shipper (Foster) who 
had selected a carrier that was involved in an 
automobile accident in which persons were 
seriously injured, after the brakes on the carrier’s 
truck failed. Plaintiffs, in addition to statutory 
and regulatory infractions that are not pertinent, 
alleged that the broker was negligent for 
selecting “...an incompetent and careless 
contractor (carrier)”. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reasoned first that the evidence was 
insufficient to hold that Foster could have 
known of prior acts of negligence by the carrier 
of such number or magnitude to have found the 
carrier to be incompetent or careless. They also 
found that Foster had no actual knowledge of 
cither poor reputation or lack of authority on the 
part of the carrier.* 4 5
Had the Court stopped there, as they should 
have, the ambiguous reasoning and inexplicable 
duties for brokers pronounced in the Schramm 
(2004) case perhaps would never have been 
visited upon the truck brokerage industry. The 
Foster (1969) court could have followed the 
conclusion reached in Mooney v. Stainless, Inc, a 
1964 case out of the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.1
... we believe the better rule to be that in 
order to render an employer liable under 
the theory of negligent selection of an 
independent contractor in cases such as 
the one at bar, it is necessary to establish 
that, at the time of hiring, the employer 
had either actual or constructive 
knowledge that the independent 
contractor was incompetent.6
2 L.B. Foster Company v. Hurnhlad, 418 F. 2d 727, 730 (9th C’ir. 1969) 
3Id.
4 Foster, at 730, 731.
5 338 F. 2d 127 (6lh Cir. 1964)
6 Id. at 131
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In addition, the mere fact that an independent 
contractor might subsequently engage in a 
negligent act raises no presumption that the 
employer was negligent in selecting the 
independent contractor for the job.7
Instead, as in so many cases where it seems that 
legal reasoning is replaced with the purpose of 
sustaining a sympathy verdict, the Foster court 
found that where direct evidence of negligence is 
missing, a jury can infer negligence by a 
. .carrier’s or transportation broker’s lack of 
experience, poor financial condition, failure to 
respect certificate requirements, and willingness 
to do business at cut rates.”8 From this premise, 
notwithstanding a total lack of affirmative proof 
of incompetence, or prior negligence, the Court 
went on to find that Foster “...failed to make a 
reasonable inquiry as to [the carrier’s] 
competence.”9
If we are to understand the fallacy of the new 
duty of due care placed upon brokers by the 
Schramm court (and courts that have followed), 
we must first realize that Foster was the only 
case cited by Schramm as a premise for the 
“new” duty of reasonable care and standard for 
“reasonable inquiry”. Also, since the Foster 
case was apparently the first court decision to 
supplant direct evidence of prior knowledge of 
carrier negligence with inference of negligence 
based upon the business acumen and financial 
sufficiency of the carrier, we must test that logic 
against our own fair analysis, before moving on 
to the failure of the Schramm court’s reasoning 
in establishing an impossible standard of care.
Return to Foster, and recall that the Foster court 
found no direct evidence of negligence by the 
shipper in selecting the carrier, but ruled instead
that negligence could be inferred by the shipper 
failing to make reasonable inquiry into the 
. .carrier’s or transportation broker’s lack of 
experience, poor financial condition, failure to 
respect certificate requirements, and willingness 
to do business at cut rates.”10 Assume arguendo 
that a broker finds a carrier for which he knows 
of no prior negligence or incompetence. The 
broker then finds that the carrier has the 
following characteristics:
1. The carrier is new and may have the 
best drivers and equipment in the 
business, but because the carrier is 
new, there exists a “lack of 
experience”.
2. Has some weak financials, as all start­
ups and many solid performance 
carriers do, thus is currently in “poor 
financial condition”.
3. I las certificates of authority that may 
be conditional because they are new, 
or may have lapsed because of 
administrative inefficiency.
4. Is willing to cut rates in order to gain 
business, as will many very safe 
carriers who have a “willingness to do 
business at cut rates”.
Assume further that the broker contracts with 
this carrier to deliver a load, knowing of no prior 
acts of negligence and finding that the carrier is 
not rated as “Unsatisfactory” by the FMCSA. 
After the carrier accepts the load, there is a 
horrible accident caused by the driver falling 
asleep. For the broker in our hypothetical, and 
the entire broker industry, how can any of the 
standards put forward by the Foster case help, or 
fairly be considered, in looking for the 
proximate cause of this accident, or finding that
Mooney, at 131. citing Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Johnson, 386 P. 2d 698 (Alaska); Strickland u State. 13 
\lisc.2d 925. 1 ~!1 N.Y.S.2d 983: Ever v. Ilehnar, 272 Mich. 513. 262 N.W. 298: Silveus r. Grossman. 307 Pa. 212. 161 
A. 362: 27 Am.Jur (Independent Contractors) 509
8 Foster, supra at 730
9 Id. at 731.
1°Id.
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the selection of the carrier by the broker was 
negligent. The answer is that such standards are 
of highly subjective quality and couldn’t 
possibly be helpful in the absence of direct proof 
of broker negligence. However, when courts 
allow juries to infer negligence from such weak 
logic, juries will too often create a path to a 
sympathetic verdict. Such standards are 
contradictions of sound judicial reasoning, 
which have in the past required direct evidence 
that the broker had actual or constructive 
knowledge that the carrier was incompetent, 
before attributing to the broker culpability for 
negligent hiring.
The Foster court cited no authority for their 
highly subjective standard for reasonable 
inquiry. As in most bad law, they reasoned 
backward to reach their result, by giving us a 
checklist of business acumen, rather than a solid 
inquiry standard. The suggested list of criteria 
for an inference of negligence is immediately 
exposed as fallacious when made a part of the 
following:
• All carriers having poor financials and 
willing to do business at cut rates are 
negligent
• Carrier “A” has never had an accident 
until now, has poor financials, lack of 
experience and is willing to do business 
at cut rates.
m Therefore, Carrier “A” must be 
negligent.
One does not have to be an expert in argument 
form to see how this syllogism stands out as 
invalid. Further, other courts have considered 
this very argument and correctly found that 
business acumen and financial responsibility 
have no place in such analysis.
As to the first point, we reject the notion 
that financial irresponsibility is cither 
equivalent to or a category of 
incompetence. Cassano v. Aschoff.’ 226 
N.J.Super. 110, 116.543 A.2d 973. 
certif. denied, 113 N.J. 371, 550 A.2d 
476 (1988): see also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 411 comment g 
(1965) (“The rule stated in this Section 
makes the employer responsible only for 
his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
employ a contractor who is competent 
and careful. It has no application where 
the contractor, although competent... is 
financially irresponsible.”).11
Equating lack of insurance and financial 
responsibility with incompetence might 
also wreak havoc in particular 
industries, such as transportation, 
because persons or entities contracting 
for transportation services would be 
required to make continuing inquiry into 
the financial qualifications of the 
contractor.12 [emphasis added]
Foster was bad law. Howcver, it was clearly the 
faulty foundation for worse law by the Schramm 
court, thirty-four years later. Both Foster and 
Schramm are seemingly examples of how bad 
law is often created by courts looking for social 
justice where a tragic accident has occurred, or 
reaching too far in creating a duty that has not 
heretofore existed. They both remind us of 
Justice Holmes’ often mis-paraphrased 
comment, “Great cases like hard cases make bad 
law. For great cases are called great, not by 
reason of their real importance in shaping the 
law of the future, but because of some accident 
of immediate overwhelming interest which 
appeals to the feelings and distorts the 
j udgment.”13
11 Mavrikidis v. Petullo, 153 N.J. 117. 707 A.2d 977 (N.J.. 1998).
12 Id. at 139, citing Robinson v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co, 4 F 3d 237 at 242.
13 Northern Securities Co. v. United States 193 U.S. 197,400-401.
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II. The Schramm Court Rules that Brokers
Must Reference an Invalid Database
(SafeStat).
The Schramm case, involved an accident in the 
state of Maryland, caused when the carrier failed 
to stop at an intersection and plaintiffs’ 
automobile collided with the carrier’s vehicle. 
Injuries to the plaintiffs were catastrophic and 
permanent. The Maryland District Court 
considered a motion for summary judgment and 
granted all parts of the motion, except for that 
part relating to negligent hiring of the carrier by 
the broker. With the seed of illogical “reasonable 
inquiry” planted by Foster, what followed was 
the sine qua non for the Schramm court to give 
us the new and intractable duty for transportation 
brokers:
This duty to use reasonable care in the 
selection of carriers includes, at least, 
the subsidiary duties (1) to check the 
safety statistics and evaluations of the 
carriers with whom it contracts 
available on the SafeStat database 
maintained by FMSCA, [italics mine] 
and (2) to maintain internal records of 
the persons with whom it contracts to 
assure that they are not manipulating 
their business practices in order to avoid 
unsatisfactory SafeStat ratings.14
Perhaps the Schramm court was looking at least 
in part for a more objective standard of 
reasonable inquiry than what they saw in the 
Foster decision. Perhaps they saw the same 
inadequacy in such a business acumen test as 
demonstrated here. However, they unknowingly 
resorted to requirements that could not produce a 
more reliable result when followed. In fairness 
to the Schramm court, they apparently did not 
know that their effort at a more objective 
standard of reasonable care was doomed by the
completely inadequate authority they chose for 
inquiry into carrier safety, i.e., ”... the SafeStat 
database maintained by FMSCA.”
In fact, these “subsidiary duties” were on the day 
announced counterproductive to any notion of 
improving the process of selecting safe carriers. 
Furthermore, the sanction of such a useless 
process by a federal district court both greatly 
confused the former duty of reasonable care for 
transportation brokers, and at the same time 
allowed FMCSA to further avoid its duty to be 
the one and only entity to administer, evaluate 
and determine carrier safety worthiness.
Consider the first “subsidiary duty” announced 
by the district court:
“(1) to check the safety statistics and 
evaluations of the carriers with whom it 
contracts available on the SafeStat 
database maintained by FMSCA.” 15
To scrutinize fairly the rationale by which the 
Schramm court pronounced this duty, one must 
ask: What would the broker in the Schramm 
case have found had they looked carefully at 
SafeStat, prior to selecting the carrier involved 
in the ensuing accident? The accident and 
concomitant duties of the broker which were the 
subject of the court’s analysis occurred on May 
2, 2002, and the court’s decision was announced 
August 24, 2004. For the interim period between 
the date of the accident and the court’s analysis 
requiring brokers to look to the SafeStat system, 
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of 
Inspector General reported the following on 
February 13, 2004:
1. Of 645,551 active interstate carriers 
on record, only 26 percent had 
sufficient data represented to 
compute a value for one or more of 
the four safety evaluation areas.
14 Schramm at 551. citing Foster, supra.
15 Schramm, supra
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2. One-third of crash reports, including 
37,000 crashes involving interstate 
carriers, were missing from the 
FMCSA’s database.
3. As of January, 2003, 42 percent of 
the reporting on active carriers 
contained outdated data.
4. For the fiscal year 2002, the average 
time in which to upload crash data 
on carriers took 158 days.
5. Thirteen percent of the 21,000 
crashes and over 70,000 of the 
inspection transactions occurring in 
our 6-month sample period contained 
carrier identification errors, such as 
failure to identify a carrier associated 
with the violation, or in a smaller 
number of instances, identifying the 
wrong carrier.
6. In an estimated 11 percent of the 
inspection errors the wrong carrier 
was held accountable for the SafeStat 
related violation.
7. Problems with the inaccurate data are 
compounded because no effective 
system is in place now to facilitate 
the correction of errors in data 
reporting.
8. Missing crash reports may place a 
lower risk carrier in a deficient 
category because data for a higher 
risk carrier is not included in the 
calculation.
9. The effectiveness of the SafeStat 
scoring and ranking calculations is 
highly dependent on the quality of 
the crash data file, which in the past 
was missing a substantial number of 
reportable crashes.
10. If public dissemination of SafeStat 
results is to continue, the data must 
meet a higher standard. The types 
and magnitude of data problems we
found argue for immediate and 
effective action.16
Perhaps the Schramm court was somehow ruling 
on insufficient or poorly presented evidence, or 
took unfounded rationale without precedent 
from briefs by the parties, but for unknown 
reasons and no proven prior validity, the court 
created a “subsidiary duty” sui generis, that was, 
by objective facts then available, contrary to any 
notion of best practice. Moreover, this newly 
announced duty made it mandatory for brokers 
to look to a source (SafeStat) that had been 
found to be unreliable by the Inspector General’s 
office six months before the Schramm decision 
was published. In fact, the Inspector General’s 
report was clearly saying that the data was 
incomplete, invalid as an indicator of accurate 
reporting on carriers and recommending that the 
SafeStat site be taken out of public view and use 
months before the Schramm court mandated its 
use.
Seemingly, the Schramm court was desperate for 
an empirical source to which brokers and other 
shippers could turn and get a clear indication of 
the safety worthiness of carriers. They 
apparently assumed far greater validity for the 
information to be found on SafeStat than existed. 
With all of the information that was available at 
the time of their decision, they either knew or 
should have known that SafeStat was anything 
but a failsafe source of carrier safety evaluation. 
Still, inexplicably, they created a standard that 
was immediately incapable of confirming 
“reasonable care” or “diligent inquiry”, since the 
source to which the court directed brokers could 
not possibly provide completely valid 
information, and thus, absolutely could not be 
reliable, by definition.
(The reader is invited to test this conclusion 
against any of the ten findings mentioned above
16 U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General: Executive Summary Audit Report No. MH- 
2004-034. February 13. 2004; http://\v\v\v.oin.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/mh2004034.pdf
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in the Inspector General’s audit of 2004; e. g., if 
11 percent of the inspection errors were 
attributed to the wrong carrier, how may we 
reliably make any determination as to the carrier 
we are researching? If 74% of the registered 
carriers did not have sufficient data represented, 
how was the broker in Schramm to know with 
reliability whether the carrier they were 
researching was among them? If in 11 percent 
of the inspection errors the wrong carrier was 
held accountable for the SafeStat violation, how 
was the broker to know whether the carrier they 
were researching was among these wrongfully 
charged with a violation.)
All indications of the unreliable nature of 
SafeStat continued to mount from the time of the 
Schramm decision. By 2007, the Inspector 
General made the following findings and 
recommendations:
• We found that, although improvements 
have been made, problems still exist 
with the reporting of crash data.
• Completeness of data is critical for 
SafeStat because scoring involves a 
relative safety ranking of one carrier 
against other carriers competing for the 
same business.
• Missing crash reports may place a lower 
risk carrier in a deficient category 
because data for a higher risk carrier is 
not included in the calculation. 
Consequently, FMCSA should continue 
to limit public use until it can assess 
whether significant crash reporting 
problems remain.
• Before FMCSA allows public access to 
SafeStat scores, it must improve its 
ability to measure the completeness of 
non-fatal crash reporting.17
Shortly after the Inspector General reported this 
information to Congress; on February 21, 2008, 
the FMCSA put the following disclaimer (in 
part) on the SafeStat website:
“Caution Urged in the Use of SafeStat Data”
The message that followed this notice included a 
description of how information was reported to 
the FMCSA and problems with variation in that 
data reporting. The description was summarized 
with this statement:
“Accordingly, SafeStat’s ability to 
accurately and objectively assess the 
safety fitness of individual motor carriers 
may be inconsistent and not conclusive 
without additional analysis. " [emphasis 
added]
This announcement confirming the invalidity of 
the SafeStat information on carriers was then 
followed by this boldfaced disclaimer:
WARNING
Because of State data variations,
FMCSA cautions those who seek to use 
SafeStat data analysis system in ways 
not intended by FMCSA. Please be 
aware that use of SafeStat for purposes 
other than identifying and prioritizing 
carriers for FMCSA and state safety 
improvement and enforcement programs 
may produce unintended results and not 
be suitable for certain uses.18
In the same year that the Schramm decision was 
published, the Inspector General’s Office 
concluded that SafeStat was no longer a valid 
measurement device for carrier safety 
worthiness: “FMCSA must act to revalidate the 
SafeStat model because changes have occurred
U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General: Letter from Inspector Genera! Scoval to 
Congressman Petri with attached Briefing, June 19, 2007; http://wMW.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/ 
SAFESTAT.PDF
18 FMCSA, Safety Measurement System, http://ai. fmesa.dot, gov/SMS/
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since the 1998 study that supported the model’s 
validity.”19 20
The Schramm court established a rule of law that 
was clearly wrong on the date it was announced. 
No clear and reliable safety determination was 
available to the broker in Schramm had they “... 
check[ed] the safety statistics and evaluations of 
the carriers with whom it contracts available on 
the SafeStat database maintained by FMSCA”, 
nor was one available to all the brokers 
henceforth that have been irresponsibly 
burdened by this decision, which is inexplicable 
except for the motive of reaching a social justice 
decision. The FMCSA reporting function that 
had been a failure since its inception in 1999, 
was a failure prior to and on the date of the 
Schramm decision, and continues to be a failure 
to this day, even its present form known as 
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010 (CSA 
2010), Safety Management System (SMS), as 
later developed here.
In summary, the SafeStat measurement system of 
carrier safety was invalid and unreliable at the 
time of the ruling in Schramm. Flowever, due to 
a lack of a careful and cogent analysis, courts 
and court decisions have continued to allow 
juries to consider the incredulous notion that 
brokers should have looked to the SafeStat 
system for information on carriers as a part of 
their duty of reasonable care in selecting a 
carrier.-10 Perhaps more important, the unusual 
mandate by a federal court, giving specific 
direction to such an unreliable source, has been 
accepted as procedure that must be followed by 
many who counsel transportation brokers on risk 
management, and cottage industries have been 
created to look for and evaluate information that 
is by any definition unreliable.
III. FMCSA Replaces Safcr/SafeStat with
Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010
(CSA 2010) and the Safety Management
System (SMS).
The problems with SafeStat and continued 
public outcry, along with Congressional 
oversight and pressure, resulted in the FMCSA 
announcing the agency function that was to 
replace SafeStat as a carrier safety measurement 
system. In their Five-Year Plan for 2006-2011, 
the agency provided the first description of 
CSA-2010:
The intent of CSA 2010 is to establish an 
operational model that will determine 
the relative safety fitness risk attributable 
to every motor carrier and develop 
streamlined approaches to change the 
behavior of poor motor carrier 
operations and their drivers. The CSA 
2010 will ultimately provide FMCSA a 
new modern-operational model that will 
greatly enhance the Agency’s efficiency 
at gathering and properly evaluating a 
greater proportion of the regulated 
population.21
This intent was followed by the rollout of the 
CSA 2010 Operational Model, in December, 
2010, with the following stated purpose: “CSA 
re-engineers the former enforcement and 
compliance process to provide a better view into 
how well large commercial motor vehicle 
carriers and drivers are complying with safety 
rules, and to intervene earlier with those who are 
not.”22
Since the inception of CSA 2010 and the SMS 
measurement categories for carrier safety, this
19 Executive Summary Audit Report, supra, p. iv. (2004).
20 See, Jones v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. 558 F. Supp. 2d 630.
21 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, FMCSA Strategic Plan 2006-2011. http://www.tmcsa.dot.tzov/fmesa- 
strategic-plan-102907.htm
22 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, CSA - Compliance, Safety, Accountability, website http:// 
csa. fmesa. dot, cov/about/csa how, aspx
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new alternative has also been found to be invalid 
and unreliable for sueh a purpose. The 
foundation for the conclusion that this 
measurement system is also invalid and 
unreliable for the purpose of determining carrier 
safety with reasonable certainty includes the 
following:
1. Anne Ferro, Administrator, FMCSA, 
stated before Congress that the 
FMCSA will replace SafeStat with 
the Safety Management System 
(SMS), and that the Agency can rate 
only between two and three percent 
of the carrier population annually.23
2. Because of skewed data and 
disproportionate impact on carriers, 
the National Association of Small 
Trucking Companies (NASTC), ct al. 
filed suit against the FMCSA on 
November 29, 2010, seeking a stay 
on the implementation of SMS and 
its ostensible measurements of 
carrier safety (Behavior Analysis and 
Safety Improvement Categories 
“BASICS’').24
3. In a settlement agreement between 
NASTC, et.al., and FMCSA, on 
March 4, 2011, the FMCSA, agreed 
to publish a disclaimer on the SMS 
website, admitting that,
Readers should not draw 
conclusions about a carrier’s
ov erall safety condition simply
based on the data displayed in the
system [emphasis added] Unless a 
motor carrier in the SMS has received
an UNSATISFACTORY, safety rating 
pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or has 
otherwise been ordered to discontinue 
operations by FMCSA, it is 
authorized to operate on the nation’s 
roadways.25
4.During the twelve months that SMS 
has been used by FMCSA to evaluate 
carrier safety, there have been 
numerous database changes, with the 
following noted as deficiencies in 
fairly rating all carriers within the 
test states:
• Only 11 percent of regulated carriers 
have any scores.
• Crash data includes both preventable 
and non-preventable accidents. Less 
than 4 percent of regulated carriers 
have crash data included.
• “Unsafe driving” scores are recorded 
only in conjunction with roadside 
inspections, and measure only 4.8 
percent of the regulated carriers.
• The “fatigued driving” BASIC 
measures only 2.5 percent of the 
regulated carriers.
• “Vehicle maintenance” measures 
only 9 percent of the industry.
• “Driver fitness” measures only 2 
pcrcentof the industry. Most points 
are accumulated for drivers not 
having medical cards in their 
possession - not for actual 
disqualifying medical conditions.26
Sueh uncertainty and lack of validity to critical 
mass measurement of all regulated carriers has 
led to concern by financial institutions and the 
capital markets invested in the transportation
; Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure Subcommittee On I lighways And Transit U.S. House Of 
Representatives; Statement of Anne S. Ferro, Administrator, FMCSA;, June 23, 2010; http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/ 
ne\vs/speeches/Statement-of-Anne-S-Ferro0623 I O.aspx
24 National Association of Small Trucking Companies, et al. v. FMCSA (D.C. C'ir. No. 10-1402)
25 Id., Settlement Agreement, March 4, 2011. Document ID: 1297064
26 U.S. Department of Transportation. Paul E Green and Daniel Blower. Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model 
Test, University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, FMCSA-RRA-11-019 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2011), 
p. 27.
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industry. One such company, Wells Fargo 
Securities, LLC, completed a thorough statistical 
analysis and reported their findings on 
November 4, 2011,
In fact, according to our analysis of the 
200 largest carriers in the CSA 
database, we find no meaningful 
statistical relationship between actual 
accident frequency and BASIC scores 
for Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving or 
Driver Fitness... we feel BASIC scores 
should not be used exclusively in 
assessing carrier risk and that they may, 
in fact, provide misleading 
information.27
Unfortunately, since the installation of CSA 
2010 and its measurement devices for carrier 
safety contained within the SMS; brokers, 
shippers and carriers are left with another 
unreliable measurement system for carrier safety. 
While CSA 2010 and its measurement system, 
SMS, are the successors to SafeStat, no court has 
yet been required to rule on whether brokers 
have the duty to look to the carrier safety 
information within SMS. However, brokers 
operate daily under the threat of vicarious 
liability should they fail to follow the mandate of 
the Schramm Court, and A. .check the safety 
statistics and evaluations of the carriers with 
whom it contracts available on the SafeStat 
database maintained by FMSCA.”28 29
Never has a court offered any more meaningless 
and completely counterproductive direction.
The paranoia and complete uncertainty 
surrounding the “new” duty of reasonable care 
for brokers in selecting carriers should never 
have come to be. It was originated by bad 
analysis, and over-reaching judicial direction to
an invalid source of inquiry. The complete 
impossibility of this new duty of care has been 
exacerbated, rather than alleviated, by the 
bandwagon tendency for some who advise 
brokers to parrot the Schramm decision, and 
advise that brokers must “... check the safety 
statistics and evaluations of the carriers with 
whom it contracts available on the SafeStat 
database maintained by FMSCA”. Rhetorically, 
and in fact, we must ask: To find what, exactly, 
which might be reliable?
It was bad advice when originated by the 
Schramm Court, for all the reasons outlined 
herein, and it is bad advice today. In light of all 
the information that has been generated and even 
the admissions of the FMCSA, for brokers to 
originate and perpetuate a business process that 
requires them “...to check the safety statistics 
and evaluations of the carriers with whom [they] 
contract...” on either the former SafeStat 
system, or its successor, the SMS, amounts to 
drinking the proverbial Kool-Aid. A better 
argument could perhaps be made that it is 
negligence per se for brokers to make a 
judgment about the safety worthiness of carriers 
from what has been demonstrated to be 
unreliable and certainly incomplete information 
currently found on the SMS. They will never be 
able to substantiate diligent inquiry by referring 
to bits and pieces of unreliable data.
How can such an inquiry satisfy any meaningful 
duty of due care, when the FMCSA directly 
contradicts such advice on the SMS website with 
their very clear disclaimer, “Readers should not 
draw' conclusions about a carrier's overall 
safety’ condition simply based on the data 
displayed in the system."2'’ Further, as if the 
disclaimer is not enough, FMCSA adds in its 
explanation of what SMS is, and is not, “[t]he 
SMS results displayed on the SMS website are
27 CSA: Good Intentions, Unclear Outcomes; Anthony Gallo, CFA, Senior Analyst; Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Equity 
Research Department, November 4, 2011
2S Schramm , supra
29 FMCSA. Safety Management System, http:/'ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS/Data/ 
carrier.aspx?enc^KxcVSWt’Ecav9s9SnBUikeRZBvr+pUdovFGgZJQl 8\vi>s~
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not intended to imply any federal safety rating of 
the carrier pursuant to 49 USC 31144.,m 
[emphasis added] That being so, we must ask 
was there ever any valid reason for brokers being 
sent into this nightmare of "checking safety 
statistics and evaluations of carriers”? The 
answer is clearly, no! It resulted from bad law 
and lack of understanding of just how 
completely invalid the information was at the 
bottom of the rabbit hole chosen by the 
Schramm Court.
IV. How Must This Folly Be Corrected?
By different means and methods, a strong 
consensus must be achieved by both courts and 
Congress that the FMCSA is the only entity 
charged with determining the relative safety of 
commercial carriers. The nonsense must end. 
Laypersons must not be charged with looking at 
experimental and, so far, invalid tools in a futile 
effort to somehow document “diligent inquiry” 
from information that by definition is unreliable 
as an indicator of current and complete 
information on all carriers (and therefore, on the 
carrier they are researching).
Congressional oversight of the FMCSA has been 
lacking in requiring of FMCSA proper 
accountability for their primary responsibility, at 
least since the introduction of the SafeStat 
system in 1999. No further Inspector General 
audits and warnings should be required before 
the FMCSA is either to admit that their 
responsibility cannot be achieved by current 
means, or completely sanction the rating of all 
carriers for which they have not made a 
determination of “UNSATISFACTORY”, 
consistent with their own construction of their 
duty,
Unless a motor carrier in the SMS has 
received an UNSATISFACTORY, safety 
rating pursuant to 49 CFR Part 385, or 
has otherwise been ordered to 
discontinue operations by FMCSA, it is 
authorized to operate on the nation’s 
roadways.30 1
There is in this advisory an immediate dilemma 
for FMCSA if they, or the courts, suggest that 
brokers should not be limited in their duty of 
diligent inquiry to relying exclusively upon a 
search for an “Unsatisfactory” rating, or not. To 
suggest that a broker, with limited resources, 
must look into the maze of unreliable 
information, or infer relative safety from 
BASICs that may be distorted for all the reasons 
discussed herein, is to say that the broker (and 
the public) cannot rely upon FMCSA to 
authorize only safe carriers. Courts should in the 
future be reluctant to hold a broker, with limited 
understanding and reasons to believe that SMS 
data may be unreliable, culpable for selecting a 
carrier that has been authorized by FMCSA, 
with their vast investment in measurement 
systems with which to designate carriers as 
“authorized”.
Title 49, U.S.Code § 31 144, requires the 
Secretary of Transportation (delegated to 
FMCSA per 49 CFR 385) to:
(1) determine whether an owner or 
operator is fit to operate safely 
commercial motor vehicles, utilizing 
among other things the accident record 
of an owner or operator operating in 
interstate commerce and the accident 
record and safety inspection record of 
such owner or operator -
(2) periodically update such safety 
fitness determinations;
30 SMS Information Center, What is the Motor Carrier Safety Management System (SMS)?, http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/ 
SMS/InfoCenter/default.aspx#question 1.
31 SMS Website, supra
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(3) make such final safety fitness 
determinations readily available to 
the public;
There is no reasonable construction of this 
statutory language that would impose upon 
shippers, brokers and third-party logistics 
companies the duty of determining whether a 
carrier is safe. That is a statutory duty of the 
Department of Transportation, through the 
offices of their administrative agency, the 
FMCSA. There is no statutory or regulatory 
authority for the FMCSA to delegate this 
responsibility to members of the public who 
must choose a motor carrier from those 
registered with the FMCSA. There is no 
statutory or regulatory authority that allows a 
SafeStat or SMS measurement category (i.e., 
“BASICs”) to be used as a “safety rating” in lieu 
of the procedure prescribed by 49 CFR 385, 
which by regulation mandates the statutory duty 
of the FMCSA to “make such final safety fitness 
determinations readily available to the public;”32 33
49 C.F.R. § 385.1 Purpose and Scope, provides:
(a) This part establishes FMCSA’s
procedures to determine the safety fitness 
of motor carriers, to assign safety> ratings, 
to direct motor carriers to take remedial 
action when required, and to prohibit 
motor carriers determined to be unfit 
from operating a CMV. [emphasis added]
If we are to understand the confusion that has 
been created by the FMCSA and exacerbated by 
some courts, we must understand the difference 
between this clear statutory duty and what has 
resulted by years of FMCSA focus on safety 
management controls, as a means of achieving 
the ultimate objective and statutory duty to 
provide ‘ final safety' fitness determinations ”n, 
i.e., assign safety ratings.
These helpful distinctions are made at 49 C.F.R.
§ 385.3 Definitions and acronyms:
• Safety fitness determination means the 
final determination by FMCSA that a 
motor carrier meets the safety fitness 
standard under §385.5
• Safety' rating or rating means a rating of 
“Satisfactory”, “Conditional” or 
“Unsatisfactory ”, which the FMCSA 
assigns to a motor carrier using the 
factors prescribed in § 385.7
FMCSA database measurement tools such as the 
former SafeStat, or the current SMS, are not 
safety' fitness determinations or safety ratings. 
They are measurement tools that remain under 
development toward validity and reliability.
They should be viewed as such in the future by 
courts considering the admissibility of such 
uncertain data. While they are under 
development, and until completely valid, they 
should not be viewed by the public in lieu of or 
in search of a statutorily required safety rating. 
[emphasis added]
The former SafeStat and current SMS 
measurement categories have been proven to be 
nothing more than incomplete attempts to gather 
metrics with which the FMCSA can make fitness 
determinations and safety ratings. THEY ARE 
NOT COMPLETED SAFETY RATINGS! It 
follows that when such tools are of questionable 
validity and reliability, they should be kept from 
the public view, rather than be mistakenly 
designated by courts as sources to which brokers 
must look. To do so would avoid the many dire 
consequences brought about by misleading the 
shipping public, and the courts that have 
misguidedly given these invalid tools 
undeserved credence as part of common law 
duties.
32 49 U.S. Code § 31144 (3)
33 Id.
18 Journal of Transportation Management
A. Suggested Congressional Action
The FMCSA has completely failed to fulfill the 
statutory and regulatory duty of providing to the 
public accurate and timely safety ratings on all 
registered carriers. This failure is glaring and 
complete, since the inception of the FMCSA in 
1999. There has never been a time, since the 
inception of the FMCSA, that they have been 
able to publish a “final safety fitness 
determination” for all, or even a significant 
portion of the active interstate motor carriers.
As of December 23, 2011, the FMCSA reports:
• 792,704 active interstate motor 
carriers, with 118,327 (14.92%) of 
these having a safety rating of cither 
Satisfactory, Conditional, or 
Unsatisfactory.
• 338,380 For Hire interstate motor 
carriers, with 61,067 (18%) of these 
having a safety rating of either 
Satisfactory, Conditional, or 
Unsatisfactory
• 454,324 Private interstate motor 
carriers, with 57,260 (12.6%) of 
these having a safety rating of either 
Satisfactory, Conditional, or 
Unsatisfactory34
Since Administrator Anne Ferro states that the 
FMCSA can only rate two or three percent of the 
motor carriers annually35, it is unknown how 
many of these are current, but by mathematical 
certainty, many are so old they are meaningless 
as far as current safety worthiness. While 
spending $45 million on CSA 2010 since 2007, 
and requesting $78 million for 2012,36 the 
FMCSA has created new measurement 
categories for "intervention” (of questionable 
validity and reliability), but has not created a
system that can give a definitive and final Safety 
Rating on all registered carriers. Their delegated 
duty, under 49 U.S. Code § 31144, is to 
“determine whether an owner or operator is fit to 
operate safely commercial motor vehicles...”, 
and to, “make such final safety fitness 
determinations readily available to the public”, 
[emphasis added]
The FMCSA claims, “The CSA 2010 will 
ultimately provide FMCSA a new modem- 
operational model that will greatly enhance the 
Agency’s efficiency at gathering and properly 
evaluating a greater proportion of the regulated 
population.” Flowever, only 11 percent of 
registered carriers had any scores in the CSA 
Safety Management System as of August 2011,37 
and of those with scores at least one significant 
study found, “...no meaningful statistical 
relationship between actual accident frequency 
and BASIC scores for Unsafe Driving, Fatigued 
Driving or Driver Fitness.”38
Congress should focus on clarifying for the 
FMCSA exactly what their duties and priorities 
should be. At the current pace the FMCSA will 
have spent over 120 million dollars on CSA 
2010 by the end of budget year 2012, and at best 
they have created a data recording system that 
has questionable value for predicting carrier 
safety for less than twenty percent of the 
750,000 registered motor carriers. They still 
have no system that accomplishes the rating of 
all carriers as either; Satisfactory, Conditional, or 
Unsatisfactory. I lowevcr, because of some 
confused judicial understanding of exactly what 
the SafeStat and SMS measurement systems can 
provide, the FMCSA’s continued publication of 
SMS BASICs measurements imply to the public, 
and to some courts, that such data is valid for
34 FMCSA data base response to Freedom of Information Act inquiry, December 23, 2011.
35 See. Note 22
36 United States Government Accountability Office; Susan Fleming Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues; Report to 
Congress, February 25, 2011; GAO-11-416R
37 Evaluation of the CSA 2010 Operational Model Test, supra
38 Wells Fargo, supra.
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evaluating a clear determination of carrier safety. 
It simply is not.
Congress must recognize FMCSA’s clear failure 
to provide final and timely Safety Ratings on all 
registered motor carriers, and that within the 
context of this failure they have caused courts 
and the shipping public to be confused and 
burdened as to a reasonable and fair process for 
determining the safety worthiness of authorized 
motor carriers. As a first step in correcting this 
failure they should require FMCSA to remove 
from public view the developmental data 
(BASICs) now being displayed within the SMS. 
By FMCSA’s own admission, its visibility and 
decisions made there from may have unintended 
consequences. Removing this data from public 
view will also relieve brokers and the shipping 
public from the mistaken judicial inference that 
such data is a reliable source for a final Safety 
Rating. Finally, and most import, requiring the 
FMCSA to remove this incomplete 
“intervention” data disabuses the notion that 
brokers and other shippers should have a duty to 
refer to it as a part of their diligent inquiry and 
duty of reasonable care.
Once such data is removed from public view, 
FMCSA may continue to develop it to a point of 
reliability and perhaps increased efficiency in 
performing their duty to provide final safety 
determinations and safety ratings on all 
registered carriers. In the interim, Congress, the 
transportation industry, shipping public and 
courts should not get confused by the FMCSA’s 
apparent effort to rationalize and obfuscate their 
failure to fulfill their statutory and regulatory 
duty to provide to the public, “... final safety 
fitness determinations”39 [emphasis added].
They simply have not done so in their entire 
existence.
B. Future Jurisprudence Must Provide a
Duty of Reasonable Care for Brokers
That Corrects the Imputed Duty to Refer
to an Invalid Data Source
As has been demonstrated, the Schramm court 
required brokers to refer to a system of carrier 
safety evaluation (SafeStat) that was full of error, 
invalid and unreliable on the day their decision 
was announced. The successor to SafeStat,
SMS, is at best a work in progress and is also 
invalid and unreliable as a definitive Safety 
Rating on motor carriers. It is clearly disclaimed 
as such by its originator, FMCSA.40 Future 
litigators, and courts who hear such cases, must 
develop a remedial standard of due care for 
brokers that eliminates the Hobson’s choice of 
being required to refer to the SMS measurement 
system for a definitive Safety Rating. For the 
vast majority of registered carriers it simply is 
not there. If it is there it is of questionable 
relevance due to issues of timeliness, errors in 
reporting and ratios computed that are 
imbalanced with greater weight to larger 
carriers.
So much more is known (than at the time of the 
Schramm decision) about the likely unreliability 
of SMS data that courts should be more inclined 
to exclude it as irrelevant, lacking in probative 
value, confusing and untrustworthy. The Federal 
Rules of Evidence and the corollary state rules, 
have many provisions that should be considered 
in motions in limine that fully develop the 
questionable relevance, probative value, 
confusion factor and hearsay nature of many of 
the data categories within SMS.
• Fed.R.Evid. 401 says, "Relevant
evidence” means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more
39 Title 49, U.S.Code § 31144(3)
40 FMCSA, Safety Measurement System, http://ai.1mcsa.dot.yov/SMS/
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probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence.
• Fed.R.Evid. 403 prov ides that even 
relevant information may be excluded if 
its probative value is outweighed by a 
danger that the evidence could be 
confusing, misleading or a waste of the 
court’s time.
• Fed.R.Evid. 803 (8) denies the 
admission of government reports or data 
compilations in civil actions if the 
sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness.
Assume that a broker researches a carrier and 
finds proper authority, regulatory insurance in 
place and a safety rating other than 
Unsatisfactory. The broker concludes that the 
carrier is properly authorized by FMCSA, and 
the broker has no current knowledge of 
incompetence or unsafe operations by the carrier. 
The broker knows that the SMS data is 
incomplete and that it may contain BASICs data 
that is incomplete and outdated, with ratios that 
are skewed by large carrier presence, and that a 
reputable statistical study concluded “...we find 
no meaningful statistical relationship between 
actual accident frequency and BASIC scores for 
Unsafe Driving, Fatigued Driving or Driver 
Fitness”.41
Is admission of the SMS data, or broker's failure 
to look at such data, fairly likely to make it more 
or less probable that the broker was negligent? 
Given the established unreliability of the former 
SafeStat information, and the current state of 
confusion regarding SMS measures, is there any 
context in which the SMS data should not be 
excluded under Rule 403? Given the FMCSA’s 
acknowledgement that SMS data is not a safety 
rating, but rather for internal intervention 
purposes, along with their disclaimers and
published acknowledgment that all carriers are 
authorized to operate on the nation’s roadways, 
unless they have been given an Unsatisfactory 
safety rating, is it more or less likely that 
presentation of SMS data is both confusing and 
untrustworthy under Rule 803 (8)?
It is suggested that more courts should rule as 
the Middle District Court of Georgia did when 
requested to take judicial notice of safety ratings 
published on the former SafeStat, finding that 
such data was not reliable evidence routinely 
contemplated by the rules governing judicial 
notice.42
CONCLUSION
V. Conclusion: Returning to a Sensible
Duty of Care for Brokers
It has been argued herein that brokers and third- 
party logistics companies were for many years 
under a reasonable standard of care in selecting 
carriers, before the Schramm decision 
erroneously required that they refer to a source 
(SafeStat) that was invalid and unreliable in 
order to meet their duty of diligent inquiry and 
reasonable care. Furthermore, for all the reasons 
stated herein, the successor to SafeStat,
FMCSA’s Safety Management System, is as 
untrustworthy, if not more so.
With the proven failure of the FMCSA to 
provide final safety determinations and safety 
ratings for the vast majority of registered motor 
carriers, there simply is no definitive source with 
which brokers can make a meaningful 
determination of carrier safety. They are left 
with only a semblance of such a source. They 
can do as they have done for many years and 
refer to the safety rating provided by the 
FMCSA, in those instances where it is available. 
If such a rating is not available, surely the broker
41 Wells Fargo, supra
42 See FCCI Ins. Group v. Rodgers Metal Craft. Inc., 2008 WL 4185997 (M.D. Ga. 2008)
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cannot he negligent for failure to infer one from 
what has been shown to be unreliable 
information.
The FMCSA has clearly failed its statutory duty, 
which in turn means that the Department of 
Transportation has failed to provide to the public 
“final safety determinations” and “safety ratings” 
as mandated by 49 U.S. Code § 31144.
Congress has failed to properly recognize the 
magnitude of this failure and require 
accountability from FMCSA. Within this 
context, the courts have failed by requiring of 
brokers and third-party logistics companies a 
responsibility that could not be fulfilled, no 
matter how long they might look as SMS 
BASICs data. It is time for the Congress, 
FMCSA and the courts to realize the nature and 
significance of this folly, and restore to brokers 
and third-party logistics companies, who are 
least culpable, a standard of care that is realistic 
and takes into consideration the magnitude of 
what has been wrought from the confusion on 
this issue.
Congress must ask the FMCSA for answers to 
the following: Can they provide to the public 
final determinations of safety on all registered 
carriers? If not. how do they intend to comply 
with their statutory duty to do so? In asking 
these question and listening to FMCSA’s 
response, Congress should not be distracted by 
FMCSA’s rhetoric about “intervention”...it is 
not the same as providing safety ratings. If 
developmental data such as BASICs is a worthy 
element of ultimately getting to the ability to 
provide safety ratings, then let it be recognized 
as such and not as a rationalization for their 
failure to perform their primary duty. It follows 
that brokers should not be assigned this duty 
with the intractable information now admitted by 
FMCSA to be less than reliable for such a 
purpose.43
The courts who in the future consider the duty of 
brokers to use reasonable care in the selection of 
carriers should do so with recognition of the 
errors of the past. Such judicial reformation 
might start with a more careful analysis of the 
real role of brokers in the facilitation of 
providing carriers for loads and loads for 
carriers. It must also take into consideration that 
some of the prior decisions that have imposed 
impossible standards upon brokers have perhaps 
been motivated by subjective reasoning. Courts 
w ho reconsider the duty of brokers, in light of 
the mistakes of the Schramm decision, might 
consider the reasoning of Judge Smith of the 
Georgia Court of Appeals,
...we arc troubled by the result in 
this case... We cannot, however, 
allow our sympathy for the plight of 
those injured by commercial trucks 
to lead us toward imposing strict 
liability on a party that does not 
possess the requisite degree of 
control over another's conduct.
Resolution of this public policy issue 
lies with the legislative branch of our 
government, not with the judiciary.44
In the interim the courts can return to a more 
sensible notion that carrier safety is administered 
by FMCSA, and FMCSA has a statutory duty to 
provide a final safety determination and safety 
rating. Brokers and other third parties cannot 
fairly be charged with this duty. It is reasonable 
to suggest that this was the recognition of all 
courts who considered this issue for the fifty 
years preceding the Schramm decision.
* Readers should note that the formatting in this 
article is reserved for Law' Review style articles. 
Regular research oriented articles should be 
formatted in conformance with the Journal’s 
Submission Guidelines.
43 See Note 24
44 Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 666 ,E.2d 567, (Ga. App., 2008)
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ABSTRACT
In 2011, McGinnis, Kohn, and Kara reported the effects of overall logisties strategy (OLS) on 
logistics coordination effectiveness, customer service effectiveness, and organizational competitive 
responsiveness. This manuscript empirically compares the three dimensions of the Bowersox 
Daugherty typology to logisties strategies among U.S., Turkish, and Guatemalan companies. US, 
Turkish, and Guatemalan subjects (logistics managers) were chosen to test the underlying factor 
structure and measurement equivalences of the scales used. Using confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA), findings indicate that the three dimensions of the Overall Logistics Strategy (OLS) - Process 
Strategy, Market Strategy, and Information Strategy - hold in all three country environments studied. 
However, structural equation modeling shows nonequivalent relationships between OLS and 
independent variables; logistics coordination effectiveness, customer service commitment, and 
organizational competitiveness for one of the three countries. We evaluate these findings in light of 
recent research into logistics strategy research on U.S. firms. Insights for those interested in 
comparative logistics strategies are provided.
INTRODUCTION
For over twenty years, a substantial amount of 
empirical research has investigated the potential 
of the Bo w'ersox/Daugherty (1987) typology and 
validated it as a useful framework for studying 
logistics strategy in the United State and Canada. 
In comparison to cross-cultural research in other 
disciplines, such as management and marketing, 
a review published by Luo, Van Hoek, and Ross 
(2001) suggests that cross-cultural logistics is at 
best in its infancy stage. Considering the speed 
of globalization, a firm’s ability to manage 
logistics in cross-country environments could 
become an important success factor. Although, 
globalization offers significant opportunities for
many MNCs to shift their manufacturing and 
distribution around the world, and especially 
towards developing and emerging markets, 
global manufacturing strategies may not be 
effective if not supported by successful logisties 
strategies. Therefore, we strongly believe that 
cross-cultural logistics studies have significant 
potential to enrich our understanding of logistics 
systems and strategies applicable in different 
national environments. Such studies provide 
critical logisties knowledge which could have 
important international logistics management 
implications.
A recent study by McGinnis, Kohn. and Kara 
(2011) reported the role of overall logistics 
strategy (OLS) on logisties coordination
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effectiveness, customer service effectiveness, 
and organizational competitive responsiveness. 
Using multi-year data collected in the US, their 
findings showed that overall logistic strategy as 
conceptualized by the Bowersox/Daugherty 
dimensions, had significant effect on firm 
competitiveness through the links of logistics 
coordination and customer serv ice. However, 
even though the best way to measure overall 
logistic strategy (OLS) may be important to 
researchers and practitioners, whether or not the 
OLS should be assumed to be universal, is even 
a more important empirical question that 
deserves research attention. Therefore, our 
interest in this study is to explore whether the 
Bowersox/Daugherty typology is a useful 
instrument for examining logistics strategies in 
countries of different sizes, cultures, and 
economic systems.
The authors postulate that a multi-country study 
of U.S., Turkey, and Guatemala would furnish an 
intriguing study of how logistics systems are 
assessed in three nations through the lens of one 
common measurement instrument. Furthermore, 
such a study would provide a strong validation 
of the dimensionality and structural relations 
identified in the recent McGinnis, Kohn, and 
Kara (2011) study. We emphasize that the 
differences in each country’s geographic size, 
population size, labor force make-up, 
infrastructure, and economic system provides an 
excellent platform for evaluating the validity of 
the research instrument, as well as providing 
insights into logistics strategies and outcomes in 
three heterogeneous countries.
This current research adopts the perspective that 
the Bowersox and Daugherty typology provides 
a strong conceptual basis consistent across 
countries with regards to salient dimensions of 
logistics strategy. These dimensions should be 
coordinated at many levels of the organization to 
achieve competitive responsiveness regardless of 
the country environment. Through this research 
we hope to uncover the applicability of logistics 
management strategy and understand the role 
logistics management strategy plays in
maintaining and enhancing competitive 
advantage responsiveness in cross-country 
environments. Using a confirmatory factor 
analysis and a structural model, we assess the 
validity of three dimensions of Bowersox and 
Daugherty typology and their simultaneous 
relationship to logistics coordination, customer 
sendee effectiveness, and overall organizational 
competitive responsiveness in three different 
countries. The model adapted from McGinnis, 
Kohn, and Kara (2011) uses a second-order 
factor, called overall logistics strategy, to 
represent the three dimensions of the Bowersox 
and Daugherty typology and ultimately assesses 
its impact on firm competitiveness.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Managers are required to know the strategies 
that are used to sell their product lines, operate 
their business model and address the demand 
variables that arc operating in their environments 
(Wanke and Zinn, 2004). Studying the 
approaches to a firm’s decision-making process 
and typologies can assist managers with future 
decision challenges. While researchers have 
found ample data among large firms to confirm 
and support the Bowersox and Daugherty (1987) 
logistics management decision making typology 
(Clinton and Closs, 1997; McGinnis and Kohn, 
1990, 1993, 1997 and 2002) there has been no 
substantive research focusing on the relevance 
the of Bowcrsox/Daughtery typology in different 
country environments. As such, there is a gap in 
the literature relating this typology and its 
applicability to different cultural environments 
of the developing and emerging markets.
Bowersox/Daugherty Typology and 
Research Variables
Bowersox and Daugherty (1987) completed a 
comprehensive study of logistics integration in 
1987. In this research they identified three 
distinctly different logistics management 
strategy types that firms have used in their 
decision-making. These decision types are
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process strategy, market strategy, and 
information strategy.
The three components that comprise the 
Bowersox/Daugherty typology were tested by 
McGinnis and Kohn (1993, 1997 and 2002). In 
these studies McGinnis and Kohn sampled 
subjects from large U.S. manufacturing firms. 
This empirical research found that process and 
market strategies were emphasized when 
logistics strategies were intense. It was also 
found that both strategies w'ere present at 
moderate levels when firms used a balanced 
strategy approach, and that both strategies were 
present at low levels when firms used an 
unfocused strategy. All of their studies 
combined, indicated that the three dimensions 
(logistics process strategy, market strategy and 
information strategy) are important and have an 
effect on firm’s successful management 
activities. They did, however, find that it is more 
likely that the three dimensions of the logistics 
strategy will be combined rather than used 
separately as Bowersox and Daughtery (1987) 
originally indicated.
In 1997 Clinton and Closs completed a major 
study testing the Bowersox and Daughterty 
typology. They sampled 818 U.S. and Canadian 
firms. The results of their study indicated that 
there was a clear overlap among the three 
strategies (information, market and process). 
They concluded that this is to be expected 
because logistics has to perform the same 
activities regardless of the overall logistics 
strategy. As such, with the typology 
demonstrating its importance in logistics 
management, it seemed only appropriate that 
more investigation should be done focusing on 
small firms since these business types constitute 
the largest employer of human resources and rely 
on logistics heavily to accomplish their goals. 
The research reported in this manuscript 
examined a sample of small firms to ascertain 
whether process, market, and information 
strategies can effectively describe logistics 
strategy in this wider context, and especially in 
the international environment.
The independent variables used in the research 
reported in this paper are based on the 
Bowersox/Daugherty (1987) typology discussed 
earlier and are summarized as follows:
• Process Strategy: Management of 
traditional logistics activities with a 
primary goal of controlling costs,
• Market Strategy: Management of 
selected traditional logistics activities 
across business units with the goal of 
reducing complexity faced by customers, 
and
• Information Strategy: A diverse group of 
traditional - and other activities - 
managed as a system with the goal of 
achieving inter-organizational 
coordination and collaboration through 
the channel.
The dependent variables used in this research 
were:
• Logistics Coordination Effectiveness:
The extent that the organization 
coordinates logistics activities internally, 
as part of its overall strategic planning, 
and though-out its supply chain 
(customers, suppliers, and other channel 
members).
• Customer Service Commitment: The 
extent that customer services is 
emphasized through employee training, 
coordinated with other logistics 
activities, and used as a source of 
competitive edge.
• Company/Division Competitiveness:
The extent that the organization quickly 
and effectively responds to, relative to 
competitors, supply chain (suppliers and 
customers) needs, competitor strategies, 
develops new products; and is considered 
a strong, moderate, or weak competitor 
in most of its markets.
All six variables are represented by scales that 
have been replicated, appear to fit the construct 
name, and have relevant levels of reliability, and 
are discussed in detail by McGinnis, Kohn, and 
Spillan (2010).
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Recently, Chen et al. (2009) addressed the role 
of integration across the supply chain and its 
effectiveness on firm performance. Utilizing the 
process approach in supply chain, they argued 
that effective integration can be achieved 
through processes across the supply chain. While 
the importance of logistics strategy and process 
integration has been emphasized in previous 
studies, empirical analysis on the effect of 
logistics strategy and logistics integration is 
surprisingly rare. We attempt to address this gap 
in the literature by decomposing logistics 
integration into two components: logistics 
process integration (Chen et al, 2009) and 
logistics information integration. Logistics 
process integration is defined as “a set of 
continuous restructuring activities aimed at 
seamlessly linking relevant business processes 
and reducing redundant or unnecessary 
processes within and across firms. We define
logistics information integration as the set of 
practices (such as electronic data interchange or 
integrated computer systems) associated with 
designing and development of information 
systems across firms.
Country Profiles
As shown in Table 1, the United Sates is much 
larger in area than both other countries 
(9,161,666 sq km/3,794,083 sq mi), with a 
varied climate, has a population of 
approximately 307.2 million, is 82% urban, a 
GDP of US$ 14,800 billion, 226,427 km/ 
140,699 mi of railroads, and 4,209,835 km/ 
2,615,942 mi of paved roads.
According to findings presented by Hofstede 
(2001), and shown as Table 2, the United States 
culture is moderate on Power Distance, low- 
moderate on Uncertainty Avoidance, high on 
Individualism, and high on masculinity.
TABLE 1
SELECTED COMPARISONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, GUATEMALA, AND TURKEY
Category United States Guatemala Turkey
Area (sq km/sq miles)* 9,826,675/3,807,983 108,889/42,042 
(Slightly smaller 
than Tennessee)
783,562/302,533 
(Slightly larger than Texas)
Population* 307,212.123 est. 13,276,517 est. 78,785548 est.
Percentage of Population Urban* 82% 49% 70%
Make up of Labor Force* Agriculture: 1.2% 
Agriculture: 50% 
Agricultural: 29.5%
Industry: 21.9% 
Industry: 15% 
Industry: 24.7%
Services: 76.9%
Services: 35%
Services: 45.8%
Gross Domestic Product* SI4.26 trillion est. S69.21 billion est. S960.5 billion est.
Climate* Varied Tropical Temperate
Railroads (km/miles)* 226,427/140.699 332/206 8,699/5398
Paved Roads (km/miles)*
2008 Public-sector
Corruption Index.
4,209,835/261,594
7.1: 22 of 178
countries.
4,893/3,040
3.2: 91 of 178 
countries.
313,151/194,559
4.4: 56 of 178 
countries.
*Source: United States Central Intelligence Agency WorldFactbook (www.cia.gov)
**Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.org). Index scores range between 9-10 = Very Clean to 0-.9 = 
Highly Corrupt.
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Guatemala provides an excellent example of a 
country that contrasts with the United States. 
According to the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency World Factbook 
(www.cia.gov, 2010), Guatemala is slightly 
smaller than Tennessee (108,889 sq km/42,042 
sq mi), tropical, has an estimated population of 
14,361,666, is 49% urban, a GDP of $69 billion, 
332 km/200 mi of railroads, and 4,863 km/2,872 
mi of paved roads. Culturally, Guatemala is 
relatively high on Power Distance, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, low on Individualism, and moderate 
on Masculinity.
As result of having the highest birth rate in 
Western Europe, Turkey has a very young 
population. It has significantly skilled and 
competitive labor, a massive domestic market, a 
unique geographical location, and a forceful 
private sector with close regional connections. 
The 2009 Census of Turkey counts its 
population at 72.5 million, with a growth rate of 
1.45 percent per annum. Two-thirds (67 percent)
of the population are in the group of those 15- to 
64-years-old. (Turkish Statistical Institute,
2010). Turkey is slightly larger than Texas 
(783,562 sq km /302,533 sq mi). Turkey is also 
one of the countries in the world with a fast 
urbanization rate, at an average yearly annual 
rate of 1.9 percent between 2005 and 2010 
(McGinley, 2009). There is a great movement 
into the cities from rural areas, which is 
producing the urban population to rapidly 
increase. Turkey has now reached almost one 
trillion dollars of GDP, and has 8,699 km/5398 
mi of railroads, and 313,151 km/ 194,559 mi of 
paved roads. Turkey’s culture is summarized as 
high on Power Distance, medium-high on 
Uncertainty Avoidance, moderate in 
Individualism, and moderate on Masculinity.
A careful review of the information presented in 
Tables 1 and 2 reveals three disparate 
environments for examining logistics strategy. 
The United States could be summarized as 
geographically large, with a population
TABLE 2
A COMPARISON OF AMERICAN, GUATEMALAN, AND TURKISH WORK PLACE
CULTURES
Dimension Index/ Interpretation United States Guatemala Turkey
Power Distance 40/38 95/2-3 66/18-19
(Moderate) (High) (High)
Uncertainty Avoidance 46/43 101/3 85/16-17
(Low-moderate) (High) (Medium-high)
Individualism/ Collectivism 91/1 6/53 37/28
(High) (Low) (Moderate)
Masculinity/ Femininity 62/15 37/43 45/32-33
(High) (Moderate) (Moderate)
Long-Term/ Short-Term Orientation 29/27
(Short-tenn oriented)
NA NA
Source: Adapted from: Geert Hofstede (2001), Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and 
Organizations Across Nations, 2nd Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage Publications. Appendix 5.
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employed predominately in services, an average 
Gross Domestic Product of approximately 
$45,000 per capita, with a varied climate, and 
extensive transportation infrastructure 
appropriate for the country’s size, and a 
moderately low level of public sector corruption. 
The United States culture is relatively 
egalitarian, more likely to be risk taking, 
individualistic, and results oriented.
Guatemala is small geographically, with a 
population employed predominately in 
agriculture, an average Gross Domestic Product 
of approximately $5,200 per capita, with a 
tropical climate, a modest transportation 
infrastructure, and an above average level of 
public sector corruption. Its culture is relatively 
hierarchical, more likely to avoid risk, 
eollectivistic, and more likely to balance 
relationships and results. Turkey is 
geographically moderate in size with a 
population predominately working in industry 
and services, an average Gross Domestic 
Product per capita of approximately $12,000, a 
temperate climate, a well-developed 
transportation infrastructure, and an average 
level of public sector corruption. Turkey’s 
culture is relatively hierarchical, between the 
United States and Guatemala on Risk Avoidance 
and on Individualism/Collectivism, and balanced 
on relationships and results.
As seen from Tables 1 and 2, as well as the 
summaries presented in the previous paragraphs, 
the results of an assessment of orientations 
toward logistics strategy in these three cultures 
should not be taken as a foregone conclusion.
An ethnocentric perspective of a United States 
practitioner or academic might be “logistics 
strategy (and supply chain management) will be 
the same, or differ little, regardless of the 
economic/cultural situation.” However, a 
polycentric perspective might argue that 
“Logistics strategy (and supply chain 
management) will be unique to each economic/ 
cultural situation, and logistics strategy will 
differ according to the economic/cultural 
characteristics of the situation.” Finally, a
geocentric perspective might argue that “The 
fundamentals of logistics strategy (and supply 
chain management) are similar and will be 
tailored to the needs of the economic/cultural 
situation.”
STUDY METHODOLOGY
The following sections examine Measures, and 
Data Collection.
Measures and Questionnaire Development
To conceptualize the factors of our research 
model, we used scales adapted from McGinnis, 
Kohn, and Spillan (2010) study. The 
questionnaire was divided into three parts. In the 
first part, the overall logistics strategy of the 
companies were measured by three dimensions; 
process strategy’, market strategy> and 
information. Respondents were requested to 
determine their level of agreement with three 
statements for process, market and information 
strategics for their company /division on a live 
point -type scale (1 = definitely agree, 
5=definitely disagree). In the second part of the 
questionnaire questions were asked in order to 
measure the relationships among logistics 
strategy constructs that are hypothesized to 
contribute logistics coordination effectiveness 
measured by three statements. Similar Likert 
scale measures (1 = definitely agree,
5=dcfinitely disagree) in the first section of the 
questionnaire were used in the second section as 
well. In the third part of the questionnaire, we 
included statements to measure customer service 
commitment and company division 
competitiveness using the same Likert Scale as 
previously used in the first and second part of 
questionnaire.
Bilingual associates translated the designed 
questionnaire into both Turkish and Spanish. To 
ensure the quality of the translation, we used 
back translations to check for any discrepancies 
and translation errors in both countries. The 
questionnaires were pre-tested with a small 
group of participants in both Turkey and 
Guatemala before the questionnaire’s 
administration. In both countries the results
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TABLE 3
INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES'
-b
3
Z
-u
Z
UJ
z
Scale items Average Cronbach Alphas
Scale 1: Process Strategy (PROCSTR)
1.1. In my company/division, management emphasizes achieving maximum 
efficiency from purchasing, manufacturing, and distribution.
1.2. A primary objective of logistics in my company/division is to gain control 
over activities that result in purchasing, manufacturing, and distribution costs.
1.3. In my company/division, logistics facilitates the implementation of cost 
and inventory reducing concepts such as Focused Manufacturing and
Just-in-Time Materials Procurement
USA Guatemala Turkey
.651 .524 .856
Scale 2: Market Strategy (MKTGSTR)
2.1. In my company/division, management emphasizes achieving coordinated 
physical distribution to customers served by several business units.
2.2. A primary objective of logistics in my company/division is to reduce the 
complexity our customers face in doing business with us.
2.3. In my company/division, logistics facilitates the coordination of several 
business units in order to provide competitive customer service.
.741 .624 .894
Scale 3: Information Strategy (INFOSTR)
3.1. In my company/division, management emphasizes coordination and 
control of channel members (distributors, wholesalers, dealers, retailers) activities.
3.2. A primary objective of logistics in my company/division is to manage 
information flows and inventory levels throughout the channel of distribution.
3.3. In my company/division, logistics facilitates the management of information 
flows among channel members (distributors, wholesalers, dealers, retailers).
.629 .739 .903
*C/D
UJ
3
>
z
z
l ogistics Coordination Effectiveness (LCE)
4.1. The need for closer coordination with suppliers, vendors, and other 
channel members has fostered better working relationships among departments 
within my company.
4.2. In my company logistics planning is well coordinated with the overall 
strategic planning process.
4.3. In my company/division logistics activities are coordinated effectively 
with customers, suppliers, and other channel members.
.609 .733 .818
Customer Service Coordination (CSC)
5.1. Achieving increased levels of customer service has resulted in increased 
emphasis on employee development and training.
5.2. The customer service program in my company/division is effectively 
coordinated with other logistics activities.
5.3. The customer service program in my company/division gives us a 
competitive edge relative to our competition.
.695 .634 .830
Company/Division Competitive Responsiveness (COMP)
6.1. My company/division responds quickly and effectively to changing 
customer or supplier needs compared to our competitors.
6.2. My company/division responds quickly and effectively to changing 
competitor strategies compared to our competitors.
6.3. My company/division develops and markets new products quickly 
and effectively compared to our competitors.
6.4. In most of its markets my company/division is a very strong competitor.
.733 .532 .907
*Scales: 1 = Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly Disagree.
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were satisfactory with respect to the 
meaningfulness and the applicability of the 
questions in those country environments.
The three independent and three dependent 
variables used in this research are presented in 
Table 3. Included in Table 3 are the items for 
each variable, and the scale reliabilities in each 
of the three countries (United States, Guatemala, 
and Turkey). Previous research (Kohn and 
McGinnis, 1997b) has concluded that the six 
variables are valid when studying logistics 
strategy using logistics managers in 
manufacturing firms for subjects.
Data Collection
Data for the research was collected using the 
developed questionnaire containing the above 
explained measures. The data for the U.S. was 
collected in manufacturing firms who were 
members of the Council of Supply Chain 
Management Professionals (CSCMP). 
Respondents from manufacturing companies 
were titled managers or higher in logistics, 
distribution, or supply chain management and 
were sampled via mail questionnaires with a pre­
notification letter, the questionnaire with a cover 
letter, and a follow-up letter.
Data for Turkey was collected using a self- 
administered questionnaire that was distributed 
to 500 SMEs (Small-Medium enterprises) 
operating in the manufacturing sector within the 
city of Istanbul. This sample was selected 
randomly from the database of the Turkish Small 
Business Administration (KOSGEB). As of 
2008, the KOSGEB database included a total of 
12,270 SMEs in Istanbul. This accounts for 
nearly 28% of all SMEs registered throughout 
Turkey.
Requests were made for the survey to be done by 
a senior officer/executive in charge of logistics, 
distribution and supply chain management. The 
responses indicated that a majority of the 
respondents completing the questionnaire were 
in fact high level members of logistics 
departments. Of the 500 surveys posted, a total 
of 232 questionnaires were returned after one
follow-up. 18 questionnaires were excluded due 
to missing values. The overall response rate was 
43% (216/500), which was judged acceptable for 
subsequent analysis. An evaluation of the yearly 
sales volume, number of employees and sub­
industry variation showed no significant 
differences between the responding and non­
responding managers. Thus, the surveys 
satisfactorily characterized the total sample 
group of manufacturers.
In Guatemala researchers worked through the 
Ministry of Economics as a means of collecting 
data. Ministry of Economics statf was trained 
by the researchers on what the survey contents 
were, how to complete the survey and how to 
respond to questions from the respondents. In 
order to collect data The Ministry of Economies 
staff conducted face-to-face interviews with 
logistics, distribution and supply chain managers 
from midsize and large companies located in 
nine major regional centers in Guatemala. From 
these interviews staff were able to collect a total 
of one hundred and eighty (180) completed, 
usable surveys. The selected firms came from a 
large geographic area, with interviews taking 
place in several different areas including 
Guatemala City, Escuintla, Villa Nueva, 
Quetzaltenango, Coban, Salama, Chiquimula, 
Sacatepequez and Peten. A total of 174 
questionnaires were retrieved, but, only 156 
usable questionnaires were attained due to 
incompleteness and other survey operations 
problems.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The first step was to check the construct 
reliabilities for all three countries. Table 3 
discussed earlier also shows comparative 
average construct reliabilities. Although some of 
the reliability scores were below the suggested 
levels in the literature, in general we can make a 
case that these scores are satisfactory for testing 
and validating the structure reported in 
McGinnis, Kohn, and Kara (2011). In addition, 
as coefficient values are relatively receptive to 
the number of items in the constructs, 
particularly when constructs have fewer than ten
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items (as in the case of the research model), it is 
common to find quite low coefficient alpha 
around 0.50 (Pallant, 2007).
With the intention of evaluate whether the 
correlations among variables are suitable for 
factor analysis, we examined the Kaiser-Mcyer- 
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO- 
MSA) (Kaiser, 1970). Table 4 shows the results 
for KMO tests for sampling adequacy and 
Bartlett’s test for sphericity for the 3 data sets of 
the US, Guatemala, and Turkey as well as the 
mean scores for the constructs in all three 
countries. The value of KMO-MSA was 0.832 
for the US sample, .900 for Guatemalan sample 
and 0.663 for the Turkish sample indicating the 
data were appropriate for factor analysis. All
KMO results were above .50 which is the 
minimum cut off for factor analysis.
Additionally all levels of significance for 
Bartlett’s test for sphericity were less than .005. 
KMO results along with the Bartlett results 
indicate the data is suitable for factor analysis.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
To confirm the underlying factor structure, the 
authors conducted CFA on all datasets using 
AMOS. We assessed the goodness of the fit of 
the models using various fit indices testified to 
in previous studies, including the + 2 statistic, 
normed fit index (NFI), non-normed fit index, 
(NNF1), comparative fit index (CFI) goodness of 
fit index (GFI); Standardized Root Mean, Square 
Residual (SRMR); and Root Mean Square Error
TABLE 4
AVERAGE VALUES OF INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
USA, GUATEMALAN, AND TURKISH MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Variables USA Data Average
1990-2008*
Guatemala Data
Average, 2010
Turkish Data
Average, 2010
Independent Variables
1. PROCSTR** 2.332 2.245 2.071
2. MKTGSTR** 2.541 2.057 2.394
3. INFOSTR*** 2.769 2.107 2.398
Dependent V ariables
1. LCE** 2.580 2.098 2.056
2 CSC** 2.5205 2.166 2.461
3. COMP** 2.3969 2.1090 2.6157
KMO Measure of
Sampling Adequacy
0.832 0.900 0.663
Bartlett’s Test
of Sphericity
0.000 0.000 0.000
'Adapted from Adapted from: McGinnis, Michael A., Jonathan W. Kohn, and John E. Spillan (2010), “A Longitudinal 
Study of Logistics Strategy: 1990-2008,” Journal of Business Logistics, Vol. 31, No. 1. pp. 217-235. **Scales: 1 = 
Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 = Disagree, 5 = Strongly Disagree. *** Significant 
differences among three countries
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of Approximation (RMSEA). The two-step 
approach suggested by Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988) was used to first examine the 
measurement model and then the structural 
model. In the measurement model, the 
relationship between the nine logistics strategic 
orientations and the three first order factors were 
examined to understand how well the 
relationships fit the data. In the structural model, 
we examined the relationship between the three 
first order factors (PROCSTR, MKTGSTR, and 
INFSTR). The findings supported the underlying 
factor structure of the 19 items with correlated 
factors.
The results of the estimation of the first order 
factor model revealed very strong results for all 
datasets used as indicated by several different 
measures (1). As suggested by McGinnis, Kohn, 
and Kara (2011), we allowed two of the error 
terms to be correlated. The figures of GFI and 
CFI, were all larger than or equal for all three 
countries (2).
The normalized chi-square (chi-square/degrees 
of freedom) of the CFA model was smaller than 
the recommended value of 3.0, the RMR was 
smaller than 0.05, and the RMSEA were smaller
than or very close to 0.08 (3). Although the X: 
value for two of the datasets were significant, 
due to the sensitivity of this measure, it was not 
considered a major concern since the other fit 
indices showed strong model fit. Accordingly, 
the results in Figure 1 showed that all loadings 
in the model were significant, leading us to 
conclude that the relationships between the 
items and latent factors were confirmed by the 
three datasets obtained from different countries.
The last step in the process to confirm the 
underlying structure of the model was to 
evaluate the relationship between the three first 
order factors and a second order factor named 
“overall logistics strategy.” The purpose here is 
to understand how the three factors contributed 
to an overall construct. The results of the second 
order confirmatory factor analyses for all three 
datasets showed very good fit indices (4).
Structural Models
The structural model was used to test the 
hypotheses of all six factors tested in the 
measurement model. The hypothesized structural 
models for three datasets are shown in Figure 2. 
Inspection of Figure 2 revealed that the all 
linkages were significant and the directions of
(X“ lisa- 31.058. X' Guatemala —48.65, and X' turkey- 38.40) (1)
GFI usa^O-962; CFI usa-0-970; GIT Guatemala- 0.940; CFI guatem ala-0.941; GFI 
xurkey^O.962; CFI turkey^0.988) (2)
(RMSEA usa=0.049; RMSEA Guatemala^.082 and RMSEATUrkey=0.059) (3)
(/2 USA- 31.058; GFI USA-0.962; CFI USA-0.970; RMSEA USA-0.049; y2 GUATEMALA 
=27.89; GFI GUATEMALA-0.940; CFI GUATEMALA-0.941; RMSEA 
GUATEMALA-0.082; %2 TURKEY- 36.37; GFI TURKEY-0.962; CFI TURKEY-0.988; 
RMSEA TURKEY-0.059) (4)
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FIGURE 1
FIRST ORDER CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF OVERALL LOGISTICS
STRATEGY
A. LSA DATA
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FIGURE 1
B. GUATEMALA DATA
First Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Overall Logistics Strategy Guatemala Data
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FIGURE 1 
C. TURKISH DATA
First Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Overall Logistics Strategy Turkish Data
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FIGURE 2
SEM FOR OVERALL LOGISTICS STRATEGY AND COMPETITIVENESS
A. USA DATA
Chisquare= 125.971, p-value=.022, GFI=. 916, CFI=. 960, RMSEA=. 043
FIGURE 2
B. GUATEMALA DATA
Chisquare=192.600, p-value=.000, GFI=.867, CFI= 910, RMSEA=.081
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FIGURE 2 
C. TURKISH DATA
Chisquare= 170.718, p-value=.000, GFI=.912, CFI=.962, RMSEA=.061
relationships were as hypothesized for the US 
and Guatemala datasets. Although the model fit 
is considered acceptable, only one of the 
hypothesized links for Turkish data was 
significant. In other words, it seems like OLS 
and LCE did not have any significant influence 
on CSC. Only CSC had significant influence on 
competitiveness of Turkish companies.
Overall, the US and Guatemala datasets 
supported the hypothesized relationship 
directions and strength of the hypothesized 
relationships, while Turkish dataset did not 
provide the expected support. While this may be 
due to some other factors not examined in the 
study, one could speculate that there might be 
fundamental differences among these constructs 
in the Turkish market environment. However, 
the authors conclude that the agreement on the 
consistency of direction of the relationships in 
factor structures in all three datasets, and support 
for hypothesized structural relationships in two 
out of three datasets, provides encouragement
regarding the relationship of logistics strategy 
and Organization Competitive Responsiveness 
in international environments.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
FINDINGS
The results of this study provide helpful insights 
to logistics/supply chain management 
practitioners regarding effective management of 
logistics strategy and contributions to 
organizational competitiveness. First, overall 
logistics strategy (OLS) does not seem to differ 
among disparate cultures. As discussed earlier, 
the three components of OLS (process, market, 
and information) appear to be consistent across 
the three cultures examined. However, 
agreement regarding the lack of significance 
between OLS and logistics coordination 
effectiveness (LCE), and the lack of significance 
between LCE and customer service coordination 
(CSC) in Turkey provides some pause regarding 
the premise that logistics/supply chain strategy 
necessarily leads to organizational
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competitiveness. In the Turkish data the lack of 
significance between OLS and LCE do not 
indicate a lack of significance between CSC and 
organizational competitive responsiveness 
(COMP). This indicates that customer services 
contributes to organizational competitive 
responsiveness regardless of whether there is a 
close relationship between the overall logistics 
strategy (OLS) and the commitment to customer 
service (CSC). These findings suggest that, at 
least in the Turkish data, that the goals of 
customer service coordination may be achieved 
across the organization, as suggested by Chen et 
al., 2009, rather than as a result of a focus by 
one component of overall strategy, such as OLS. 
While an organizational focus on customer 
service is the goal of logistics and supply chain 
management, it may be possible that an 
organization may be focused on customer 
service independent of OLS. Stated another way, 
an organization (or culture) with a commitment 
to customer service may not require the logistics 
strategy to facilitate that commitment. Further 
research into logistics strategy in other cultures 
may provide further insight into the strength of 
logistics/supply management’s role in customer 
service and organizational competitive 
responsiveness.
Our findings show that given the Bowersox/ 
Daugherty dimensions of logistics strategy arc 
invariant across the cultures/countries studied 
and that the measures of logistics strategy 
assessed by three dimensions hold in all three 
countries. These results suggest that the assumed 
links between logistics strategy and 
organizational competitiveness did not hold in 
all cultures. In other words, even if overall 
logistics strategy may be comprised of process, 
market, and information dimensions, its impact 
on overall organizational competiveness may 
vary across the nations.
In the case of the Turkish model, although not 
significant, the relationships between the 
constructs were in the hypothesized direction 
with CSC showing the strongest effect on the
organizational competiveness. At first glance, 
one might question this finding and argue 
against the validity of the structural model. 
However, the Turkish economy is going through 
a tremendous liberalization and is considered a 
major emerging market. Therefore, it is the high 
volatility market in terms of structural 
realignments, and this may result in an emphasis 
on customer service and competitive 
responsiveness being integral to strategy as the 
Turkish economy emerges into an already 
competitive global economy. Second, because 
many Turkish logistics activities arc still 
performed using traditional inefficient systems, 
an emphasis on customer service and 
competitive responsive may be resulting in 
logistics management in Turkish organizations 
being bypassed by organizational priorities and 
strategies. This might have led to a significant 
variation among the participants in terms of their 
understanding and expectations of logistics 
strategy. Finally, it is possible that the current 
structural model might not have captured the 
effects of logistics strategy on overall 
competitiveness due to the rapid changes taking 
place in the economy, Turkish business 
strategics, and lags in the role of logistics in 
Turkey.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to explore 
whether the Bowersox/Daugherty typology is a 
useful instrument for examining logistics 
strategies in countries of different sizes, cultures, 
and economic systems. Wc mentioned at the 
outset of this study that globalization has altered 
the management activities and practices of many 
world wide companies. With supply chain 
management at the center of business activity, it 
is imperative that managers find and use new 
ideas that will help them become more 
competitive in highly competitive markets. 
Finding new insights into how they can manage 
their manufacturing and supply chains is 
essential for goal attainment, profitability and 
sustainability.
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Our findings indicate that there are some 
similarities and some differences in how 
managers conceive the issues of logistics and 
how they process them and execute them in their 
daily practice. This is not unusual nor is it a 
negative out come. We would expect that in 
different cultures managers would see some 
processes, some strategics and information 
exchanges differently. It is important to note that 
the fact that there is consistency in direction and 
relationship of constructs means that the 
Bowersox/Daugherty typology is a useful 
instrument for examining logistics strategies in 
different countries and our confirmatory factor 
analysis results validate the dimensionality of 
the model. We tested previous hypotheses 
regarding the effect of logistics strategy and 
logistics practices on firm’s competitiveness in 
the context of cross sectional business firms. 
Therefore we can say that managers in different 
countries and cultures have some of the same 
ideas about the meaning of the logistics concepts 
and how they need to be implemented. This is 
very important to managers for a couple of 
reasons: (a) when considering out sourcing or 
expanding to a foreign land i.e. Guatemala or 
Turkey, managers can have a better 
understanding of how these countries will react 
to the logistical strategy, process and information 
issues that arc present in their companies and 
countries, and (b) when exporting or importing 
goods, companies can have more insight into the 
relationships that are present in the three 
concepts studied in this research. Our findings 
suggest that logistics and supply chain 
management appear to be geocentric, where, as 
stated earlier, the fundamentals of logistics 
strategy (and supply chain management), while 
fundamentally similar, will be tailored to the 
economic/cultural situation. While overall 
logistics strategy may be a driving force for 
competitive responsiveness in many cultures, it 
appears that competitive responsiveness in some 
cultures will originate elsewhere. To what 
extent these statements holds will be the result 
of further research into logistics strategy in 
additional cultures.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH
Future research into logistics/supply chain 
management should seek opportunities to 
explore practices in other countries/cultures. 
Little is known of comparative logistics/supply 
chain management in the various countries of 
Asia and the subcontinent of India. Further, 
logistics and supply chain management 
practices, and their impact on customer service 
and organizational competitive responsiveness 
have not been systematically studied. Further 
research into logistics and supply chain 
management may benefit from expanding the 
understanding of logistics/supply chain 
management decision making by including 
antecedents and moderating factors (such as 
competition, market turbulence, and differences 
in business environment) into the design.
In addition to further study of logistics/supply 
chain management in other nations/cultures, 
additional insight could be gained by examining 
the relevance of the Bowersox/Daugherty 
typology to nonmanufacturing industries 
including retailing, healthcare, financial services, 
transportation firms, and food service. These 
industries may provide a different perspective on 
the process, market, and information strategy in 
different environments.
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LTL PRICING: LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE
C. Clifford Defee 
Joe B. Hanna 
Robert Overstreet 
Auburn University
ABSTRACT
Numerous LTL carriers struggled during the recent recession as customers demanded lower prices. 
This study is designed to qualitatively evaluate the data gathered from three industry segments 
regarding LTL pricing. Researchers used semi-structured interviews to conduct an in-depth 
investigation with over two dozen industry experts who represented shippers, carriers, and 3PLs. 
Interview transcripts were analyzed using a grounded theory coding technique. Five major themes 
emerged from the interview transcripts. These themes are used to describe possible future 
adjustments to industry pricing structure.
INTRODUCTION
During the late 1970’s, legislators and regulators 
began to reexamine the impact that regulation 
was having on the motor carrier industry. Many 
experts felt that the marketplace of the 1970’s 
was far different from the marketplace of the 
1930’s which initially led to transportation 
regulation. By the late 1970’s, policy and 
industry experts asserted that regulation was no 
longer necessary and that the costs of continued 
regulation dramatically outweighed any benefits 
that might be obtained from continuing to 
regulate the motor carrier marketplace (Harper, 
1982; Pickett and Kletke, 1984; Pustay, 1985). 
Additionally, it was determined that some 
operating inefficiencies and anti-competitive 
pricing practices were taking place (Chow,
1980).
On July 1, 1980, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 
was enacted, exhibiting a shift in government 
policy toward a free marketplace, effectively 
ending forty-five years of federal regulation of 
the industry. Deregulation altered the landscape 
of the industry in many ways as carriers 
attempted to adjust to the new operating 
environment. One major challenge carriers 
faced was the pricing of their services. In a 
regulated environment, individual carriers were 
not responsible for establishing prices for 
specific services. Along with deregulation came 
the freedom and responsibility for carriers to
establish their own price for a specific service. 
Pricing in a free market environment was critical 
to carrier survival, but it was also uncharted 
territory.
U.S. motor carriers traditionally referred to the 
National Motor Freight Classification (NMFC) 
system as the basis for classifying freight. This 
classification system, along with an extensive 
tariff system developed during the regulated era, 
were still being used as guides after deregulation 
to help carriers establish transportation rates. 
Over time, the "base rates” reflected in the 
legacy pricing systems began to portray a less 
accurate depiction of motor carrier pricing 
reality. As a result, carriers began to discount 
the base rates of the old system to more 
accurately reflect the actual price of a carrier’s 
services.
Now more than 30 years removed from 
deregulation many feel the base rates, while still 
being used extensively by the U.S. motor carrier 
industry, have become almost meaningless. 
Experts point to the common practice of deeply 
discounting base rates as a primary indication of 
the gross inaccuracy of the base rates currently 
being used to price motor carrier transportation 
services. Many of these same individuals have 
also called for a complete motor carrier pricing 
system overhaul.
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We examine the current state of LTL pricing and 
draw conclusions on future directions based on a 
series of expert interviews and a qualitative data 
analysis. The paper is structured as follows.
First, relevant transportation pricing literature is 
reviewed. Second, we describe the methodology 
utilized in this research. Next, key findings are 
summarized and major themes emerging from 
the analysis are highlighted. We then comment 
on the future of LTL pricing and suggest options 
available to those pushing for change in industry 
pricing structure.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Despite the critical role of transportation, the 
pricing of transportation services has received 
little attention (Topaloglu and Powell, 2007; 
Toptal and Bingol, 2011). Relatively few 
articles have focused on the pricing of LTL 
service (Ozkaya et al., 2010). Ying and Keeler 
(1991) studied the effects of deregulation on 
motor carrier freight rates and found competitive 
pressures following deregulation had led to 
increased productivity and reduced rates subject 
to extensive discounting. Baker (1991) found 
that routine discounting, sometimes as high as 
85%, had made base rates meaningless and that 
the only meaningful figure was the effective rate 
(base rate less discounts). Smith (1993) 
acknowledged the complexity of setting prices in 
an industry where the base rate is constantly 
changing and discounting is so important to a 
firm's competitive advantage. Carter, Fcrrin, 
and Carter (1995) found evidence that purchase 
order anomalies were the result of LTL pricing 
strategies focused exclusively on highly 
competitive LTL shipments and that this tended 
to lead to overpricing the less common truckload 
shipments handled by the LTL carrier.
Richardson (1998) reported on the complexity of 
the LTL pricing system and the call by many 
industry leaders to move out of the quagmire of 
regulated thinking. The need for a change to be 
accepted across the board was highlighted by the 
problem of shippers cherry picking rates. 
Harrington (1998) provided shippers with a
primer for understanding many of the factors of 
a carrier’s rate structure and recommended that 
shippers take those factors into account in order 
to negotiate the best price for services. The 
active process of negotiating LTL prices was 
also described by other researchers (e.g., Vilain 
and Wolfrom, 2000; Caplice and Sheffi, 2003; 
Clair and Fox, 2004; L. D. Smith. Campbell, and 
Mundy, 2007).
More recent LTL studies have tried to examine 
potential alternate pricing methods. Lin, Lin, 
and Young (2009) developed a mathematical 
model to determine the optimal price for time- 
definite LTL freight services in Taiwan using 
data from one of the largest LTL carriers in 
Taiwan. Ozkaya et al. (2010) used regression- 
based methodology to estimate LTL rates based 
on three months of data from 2005. Several 
articles have offered analytical models to 
describe motor carrier pricing (e.g., Figliozzi, 
Mahmassani, and Jaillet, 2007; Topaloglu and 
Powell, 2007; Zhou and Lee, 2009; Toptal and 
Bingol, 2011).
This study follows up two, somewhat dated 
research reports that previously examined LTL 
motor carrier pricing practices. The first study 
titled “Pricing for the Nineties: An Examination 
of LTL Motor Carrier Pricing Practices and 
Suggestions for Improvement by Shipper 
Customers” was conducted in 1993 by the 
University of Tennessee’s Center for Logistics 
Research. A subsequent study examining LTL 
motor carrier pricing was conducted in 2002 by 
Norbridge, Incorporated; a management 
consulting company headquartered in Deerfield, 
Illinois. The current study is designed to provide 
the industry with up to date insights into the 
current state and future directions of LTL motor 
carrier pricing.
METHODOLOGY
Qualitative methods are being used more 
frequently in contemporary supply chain 
management research (Mello and Flint, 2009).
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Qualitative methods are quite useful when 
gaining understanding of the phenomenon of 
interest is a primary researeh goal, or the 
phenomenon is relatively unstudied as is the 
case with our investigation of LTL industry 
pricing practices (Halldorsson and Aastrup,
2003; Suddaby, 2006). We combine semi- 
structured interviewing and the constant 
comparison process of grounded theory data 
analysis, similar to the approach outlined by 
Randall, Defee and Brady (2010).
Sample and Unit of Analysis
The sample was developed from three distinct 
groupings of firms that participate in the LTL 
pricing process: LTL carriers, shippers 
(individual customers), and 3PLs (aggregators of 
multiple customers under a single freight 
contract). Approximately 30 companies were 
contacted and 25 companies agreed to 
participate. The sample provided good coverage 
from each of the three groups. Participating 
companies are listed in Table 1.
We used a judgmental sampling method 
(Fetterman, 1989) by seeking out the individual 
within each organization best equipped to 
address the topic of LTL pricing. Individual 
participants were identified within each 
organization by requesting an interview with one 
manager or executive responsible for making
TABLE 1
PARTICIPATING COMPANIES BY GROUP
Carriers 3PLs Shippers
AAA Cooper Transport Cerasis Central Steel and Wire
Averitt Express CH Robinson Deere & Company
Central Freight Lines England Logistics Mettler-Toledo
Estes Express Menlo Worldwide Logistics PACCAR Manufacturing
FedEx Services TransPlace Peerless Pump
New Penn Motor Express Unyson Logistics Pep Boys
Southeastern Freight Lines USTC Live Logistics Saint-Gobain Abrasives
UPS Freight YRC Logistics Toro Company
Wix Filtration
decisions associated with LTL pricing. In carrier 
organizations this was often a Vice President of 
Marketing, Pricing, or Revenue Management. In 
shipper and 3PL organizations the interviewee 
was typically a Director of Transportation or 
Procurement. In each case participants 
demonstrated intimate and exacting knowledge 
of LTL industry practices and specifically the 
pricing/rating process.
A total of 25 interviews were completed with an 
average duration of 28 minutes and a standard 
deviation of 12 minutes. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed for later analysis. In 
all, the single-spaced transcripts totaled 
approximately 200 pages. The unit of analysis 
for this study were the discrete statements 
regarding LTL pricing (Sherif, Zmud, and 
Browne, 2006).
Analytical Process
Each transcribed interview was initially 
reviewed for quality prior to initiating qualitative 
analysis. Grounded theorists argue that 
sampling is complete when saturation of the 
identified categories (i.e., the point of 
diminishing returns) has taken place, which as 
explained by Charmaz (2006), supersedes 
sample size. Premkumar (2003) points out that 
despite the cost and time involved, the 
interactive aspect of telephone interviews makes
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them very effective in attaining reliable data. In 
this case the final 1-2 interviews in each 
category provided limited or no new information 
suggesting saturation had been achieved (Cho 
and Trent, 2006).
The constant comparison technique (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 2006) 
was used to code, memo, categorize, and recode 
the data. Coding is the method by which the 
data are fractured, analyzed, and grouped into 
categories and ultimately into themes (Scholten, 
2009). MAXQDA, a commercially available 
software program, was used to streamline and 
organize analysis of the transcripts. This 
software uses data management techniques such 
as multi-color coding, memo creating, and code 
segment retrieval (Humble, 2009). Counts 
provided by the software represent the frequency 
for each of the themes and sub-categories (Sheri f 
et al., 2006).
The first one-third of transcripts were divided 
among two of the researchers and each 
researcher independently coded their portion of 
the transcripts. Once this task was completed, 
the research team met to review and discuss the 
individual coding results. Common terminology 
was agreed upon in cases where it was 
discovered that slightly different codes had been 
used to identify similar concepts. The research 
team then completed coding the remaining 
transcripts, frequently discussing new codes and 
recoding as necessary.
Throughout this process, codes were assigned to 
categories based on similarity of intent. 
Ultimately these categories were assigned to 
higher-level categories which represent the 
major themes emerging from the interview data 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This category 
assignment process was performed individually, 
but routinely evaluated, adjusted, and confirmed 
through frequent meetings among the research 
team.
The trustworthiness of the research was assessed 
using the technique described by Flint and
colleagues (2002). Internal (e.g., confirmation 
of results by multiple research team members) 
and external (e.g., member checks conducted 
with a sub-set of interviewees and non-sample 
business professionals) constituents were 
utilized to assess the dimensions of credibility, 
transferability, dependability, confirmability, 
integrity, and fit (see Table 2). The member 
cheeking activity was conducted with three 
carrier representatives, three executives of an 
LTL industry rating agency, and through 
feedback from two presentations of preliminary 
results at two national LTL conferences. The 
feedback provided was extremely helpful in 
shaping the initial interpretive analysis and later 
in validating our conclusions.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The interpretive analysis of interviews with 
carriers, shippers, and 3PLs resulted in five 
emergent themes. Each of these themes is 
outlined in this section. As Table 3 shows the 
themes developed cut across all industry 
participants. The categories listed in the table 
demonstrate a breadth of topics that coalesce to 
form each theme. In some cases the categories 
represent essentially opposite views (e.g., re­
indexing is needed; re-indexing is not needed). 
This demonstrates one of the inherent issues in 
the industry summarized in the last theme - 
although there is wide support that change in 
needed, there is little agreement on the best 
approach for achieving that change. We offer 
testable propositions for each theme.
Theme 1: Base Rates Should be Re- 
Indexed
A base rate is simply the standard rate offered 
for a carrier to move a given shipment from an 
origin to a destination. For example, the base 
rate for a carrier to move a 750 lb. pallet of auto 
parts from Macon, GA to Orlando, FL may be 
$250. However, the rating basis used throughout 
the LTL industry has very little relation to 
current carrier operating costs and service 
options available through existing networks.
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TABLE 2
EVALUATION OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
Criteria Method used to address
Credibility
Extent to whieh the results appear to be 
aeceptable representations of the data
Three research team members provided input 
during data analysis and interpretation
Transferability
Extent to which the findings from one study in 
one context will apply to other contexts
Triangulation across methods found common 
categories in content analysis and interviews
Dependability
Extent to which the findings are unique to time 
and place; the stability or consistency of 
explanations
Member checking confirmed category theme 
development
Confirmability
Extent to which interpretations are the result of 
the participants and the phenomenon as opposed 
to researcher biases
Saturation achieved within each of the three 
groups present in the sample
Integrity
Extent to which interpretations are influenced by 
misinformation or evasions by participants
Member checking confirmed category theme 
development
Fit
Extent to which findings fit with substantive 
area under investigation
Member checking interviewees were not 
provided an explanation of findings prior to 
interview
Notes: Trustworthiness definitions adapted from Flint et al. (2002).
Most rates used today were actually developed 
20-30 years ago or longer, oftentimes during the 
regulated period, and have been only moderately 
adjusted over the years. The rates arc frequently 
discounted 80% or more to establish the actual 
prices charged to shippers.
• “Is the base rate completely arbitrary’?
Yeah, it’s ridiculous ” (3PL).
• “If the discounts are ridiculous, 
they ’re only slightly less ridiculous 
than the base rates they 're off of ”
(Carrier).
Concern that the rating basis is meaningless is 
widespread as the bulk of comments tended to 
support the need for re-indexing. Participant 
comments from each of the groups demonstrate 
this is a generally held belief.
• “We know we 're going to have to 
update [the base rates] shortly, 
because it s getting out of whack ”
(Shipper).
This belief is not new to the industry. A study 
from 20 years ago (Baker, 1991), identified 
similar unease with the rating-pricing process.
Thus, not much has changed in the industry in 
recent years. Although a number of participants 
suggested the market is ready for the re-indexing 
of base rates, many comments highlighted the 
complexity of making such a change.
• “I don't think the marketplace is ready.
I think it would take years to get there ’’
(3PL).
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF THEME DEVELOPMENT
Theme Category Shipper 3 PL Carrier
Base rates should be re-indexed Re-indexing is needed X X
Re-indexing is not needed X X
Re-indexing will be difficult to accomplish X
The market is readv for re-indexinc X X
The market is not ready for re-indexing X X
Wide use of benchmark pricing Used for base rates X X X
Industry standard X X X
Compare across carriers X X X
Used to set freight rates charged to customers X X
Freight rates are based on 
classification rules NMFC classification is entrenched X X
NMFC classification is complex confusing X
NMFC classification is manipulated X
NMFC classification is moving to FAK X
FAK simplifies freight rating X X
FAK provides deeper discounts X
Density / cube-based pricing Future direction (near term) X X
Will add cost for shippers X X X
Will add cost for carriers X X
Carriers have already created this rate structure X X
Surprised requests have not occurred X
Industry change leadership Carriers should lead X X
Shippers should lead X X
“Neutral” party should lead (i.e., SMCT X X
Shippers and carriers in concert X
Shippers are the barrier to change X
• "I think the carriers are definitely ready 
for it. I don't think that the shippers are 
[ready] " (3PL).
• "It may he cost prohibitive given the 
ROI of most motor carriers today and 
how the industry is structured around 
it” (Shipper).
• "If the heavy discounting activity 
disappeared, obviously we wouldn't be 
able to negotiate better pricing” 
(Shipper).
The last comment points out a basic fear 
shared by each of the groups. LTL service is 
viewed as a commodity by both carriers and 
shippers. Although service levels and 
damage vary across carriers, shippers are 
extremely price conscious in making the LTL 
freight purchase decision. If re-indexing 
were to occur on a piecemeal basis, many 
individual carriers believe they may be seen 
as not being price competitive, at least until 
customers became educated on how their 
revised rate-price structure compares to the 
established structure. Alternatively, if re­
indexing were to be rolled out 
simultaneously by all carriers, the carriers
50 Journal of Transportation Management
that perceive themselves as weaker believe 
they would be at a disadvantage. Quite 
simply the motivation to change base rates 
has not been great enough to overcome the 
perceived risk of making such a change.
The entrenched nature of the base rate-pricing 
structure and lack of movement toward 
establishing new base rates over the past 20 
years suggests the industry is at an impasse on 
this issue. The interview comments and our 
review of other studies touching upon the topic 
lead us to believe the industry will not find a 
way to re-set base rates in the near future despite 
the broadly held belief this is desirable.
Theme 2: Benchmark Pricing
The concept of benchmarking to help manage a 
business by assessing your position relative to 
others in the marketplace is relatively common. 
Benchmark pricing tools - typically software 
containing base rates for all origin-destination 
combinations - are widely used by both buyers 
and sellers attempting to enhance their 
understanding of TTL motor carrier pricing 
practices. Several commercially available 
benchmarking tools are available to aid current 
and prospective customers faced with assessing 
LTL prices.
The use of benchmarking is valuable to many in 
the LTL market because of the unique pricing 
practices currently used in the industry. With 
many different sources available to establish a 
base LTL rate and many different discounts off 
of the various base rates, it is extremely difficult 
to accurately compare the actual price for a 
particular origin to destination combination.
Use of a benchmarking process helps to 
standardize the pricing process.
Shippers frequently request that new LTL 
transportation bids be based off of a specified 
tariff or commercially available LTL base rate 
benchmark tool such as SMC3’s CzarLite. This 
allows for some standardization of the pricing 
process, ultimately enhancing the ability of the
shipper to effectively evaluate carrier responses 
to their request for proposal (RFP).
• “Use of a benchmarking tool allows 
for an ‘apples to apples ’ comparison 
when we are evaluating different bids 
from potential providers of LTL 
transportation serxnces ” (Shipper).
• “Some shippers accept quotes based 
on our internal tariff base rates while 
others require quotes based on a 
different rate base source like 
CzarLite. We know our costs of 
providing specific services so we can 
quote based off of any base rate 
requested ” (Carrier).
Many participants conceded that benchmarking 
is a valuable tool, especially in an industry with 
a unique pricing system. However, others 
indicated they use caution when examining and 
interpreting LTL pricing data obtained through a 
benchmarking process due to potentially 
significant limitations. For example, several 
interviewees indicated that any current LTL 
pricing benchmark must be viewed cautiously 
due to the complexity of current LTL pricing 
practices.
• “ There are a number of base rate 
sources that can be used to help 
benchmark LTL motor carrier prices. 
Some of the benchmark sources can 
vary’ substantially, creating ambiguity 
in the results of the benchmarking 
process ” (3PL).
• Benchmarking can be a valuable tool 
when trying to establish LTL rates and 
we use it regularly as part of our 
pricing process. However, like any 
other method, you have to be 
cognizant that benchmarking has its 
limitations ” (Shipper).
Benchmark pricing tools arc widely used and 
generally understood by the three key groups of 
market participants addressed in this study. The 
majority of representatives from each of the
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three groups generally agreed that undertaking 
some form of benchmarking provides a value to 
their business and enhances the overall industry. 
While all three groups indicated benchmarking 
was a common practice, shippers and 3PLs 
tended to use benchmark pricing practices 
primarily for establishing standard base rates 
and for comparison purposes. Alternatively, 
carriers appear to be adaptable to quoting 
services using a specific requested base rate but 
they appear to use benchmark pricing primarily 
to monitor industry pricing practices and 
processes.
Theme 3: Classification Rules
Today’s LTL motor carrier pricing practices are 
unique from many other industries as a result of 
the practices established during the regulated 
period. Prior to deregulation in 1980, LTL 
motor carrier freight rates were determined by 
use of a freight classification system such as the 
NMFC. The NMFC system attempted to 
identify relatively homogeneous types of freight 
and group them into specific freight 
classifications. Once freight was categorized 
into the appropriate classification, an 
appropriate base rate could be assigned to each 
class of freight.
Once the industry was deregulated, companies 
were free to exercise business judgment and 
began to adjust the prices charged for their 
services. While prices began to change, carriers 
continued to use the NMFC system as the source 
for commodity classification because it was so 
deeply entrenched in the industry. Then, in 
order to adjust prices in the new era of 
competition, carriers began to issue discounts 
off of the published base rates for the various 
classifications of freight. As carriers expanded 
their knowledge and understanding of the costs 
of providing services, they continued to adjust 
their prices by issuing deep discounts off of the 
base rates. Over time, the base rates associated 
with various commodity classifications became 
less accurate and therefore less meaningful to 
industry participants. Despite the erosion of its
usefulness, use of the NMFC system remains a 
key part of LTL motor carrier pricing to this day.
• “ Today the base rates that stem from 
the NMFC s commodity classification 
process are almost totally meaningless 
because they do not accurately reflect 
the price you will pay for LTL motor 
carriage ” (Shipper).
• “Over time, the NMFC system s impact 
on freight categorization has 
contributed to an erosion in the 
accuracy of base rates to the point 
where the rates are no longer at all 
reflective of the costs associated with 
providing the transportation service ’’ 
(Carrier).
• “Today’s LTL pricing system is 
unnecessarily confusing and overly 
complex. Our NMFC based system is 
not congruent with the density based 
pricing systems used throughout most 
of the rest of the world” (3 PL).
While deeply entrenched, the NMFC system is 
not always extremely useful for determining LTL 
motor carrier prices. Disagreements over 
identifying the appropriate classification for a 
particular type of freight are frequent while the 
practice and severity of discounts off of rates 
based on the NMFC freight categorization 
system has continued to grow. As the NMFC 
has become less reliable as a viable predictor of 
commodity categories and, ultimately the costs 
of transporting a particular type of freight or 
servicing a particular origin-destination 
combination, carriers have begun to look for 
ways to simplify the pricing process. Many 
carriers responded by starting to use a Freight- 
All-Kinds (FAK) rate which reduced or 
eliminated the importance of classifying 
different types of freight and reduced the need to 
use the NMFC system.
• “Continued use of an antiquated and 
outdated classification system 
(NMFC) only serves to create
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confusion in the marketplace. While 
FAK rates have reduced the confusion 
associated with freight classifications, 
FAK’s are really just another way to 
offer a discount off of the N MFC’s 
largely meaningless rates ” (Carrier).
• “After 30 years in a deregulated 
environment, we have adapted to the 
continued use of the NMFC system 
and have adapted by using deep 
discounts off of base rates. The 
system can be confusing and 
burdensome to those not familiar with 
the system, and many feel it is time for 
change. ” (Shipper).
• “Because the NMFC is somewhat 
complicated, most customers prefer to 
pursue an FAK based rate. ” (3PL).
The NMFC system is an artifact from the 
regulated era of motor carriers. While 
deregulation occurred over 30 years ago, the 
NMFC system remains in place and continues to 
play a key role in LTL motor carrier freight 
categorization and pricing. While significant 
challenges exist with the use of this system for 
LTL pricing, the NMFC is so deeply entrenched 
in the industry that it is likely to continue to play 
a significant role in LTL motor carrier 
categorization and pricing processes for the 
foreseeable future.
Theme 4: Density-based Pricing
Pricing freight on the basis of density, also called 
cube-based pricing, develops from the idea that 
the price for transportation services is 
determined by the weight and space used by the 
freight being shipped. Density-based pricing is 
essentially the method major package carriers 
like FedEx and UPS use to rate package 
shipments in the U.S. and elsewhere. This form 
of pricing is widely used with LTL freight 
outside the U.S., such as in Canada, but has not 
gained acceptance in the U.S.
Many of the shippers and 3PL study participants 
believe future LTL pricing will move to a density 
model. The timing of this transition is unclear 
with most participants describing the shift to 
density pricing taking place "in the future”, 
although the majority of statements refereeing to 
timeframe anticipate a change may occur in the 
relatively near future (5 years or less). Although 
customers believe density pricing is on the 
horizon, carriers consistently downplayed the 
option. Summing up the broadly-held attitude of 
carriers, one carrier executive said, "Right now 
the industry is not ready for cube-based pricing.” 
Nonetheless, customer opinion reflects their 
interest in this alternative pricing model.
• “Theres got to be a better way to 
identify the freight and cube pricing is 
to me a good way. It's a better way 
than the NMFC pricing we currently 
have to follow” (Shipper).
• “A density tariff definitely will be part 
of what everybody uses here in the near 
future ” (3PL).
• “It’s going to take a while, but / think 
cube is going to take over” (Shipper).
• “Everything is moving to density-based 
items. I know that there are several 
carriers that already have density- 
based tariffs waiting in the wings ”
(3PL).
Despite customer enthusiasm for a density-based 
model, respondents pointed to many obstacles 
that must be overcome before a density model 
could be implemented. Chief among these 
issues are concerns over the cost of 
implementing and operating a density pricing 
solution for both shippers and carriers. The cost 
issue consists primarily of concern over the 
additional time required to capture freight 
dimensions on the dock and the cost of acquiring 
the technology needed to determine load 
proportions.
Fall/Winter 2011 53
• “ You 'd have to measure each piece of 
freight ...you really don't have the time 
in a cross-dock environment to stop 
and measure each shipment” (Carrier).
• “ The cost involved is significant to 
change the way that [carriers] 
operate, change the way that they rate, 
and to change their internal 
structures ” (3PL).
• “ The [pallet scanning] technology> is 
expensive and it s still too slow for us 
to maintain the operational service 
levels we need” (Carrier).
Although all three groups raised cost eoneems, 
many shippers may be in a position to 
accommodate a shift to density driven pricing:
• ”We don it ship anything that we don ’/ 
measure and weigh. Nothing leaves 
this facility without a weight and 
dimensions ” (Shipper).
• “There s not going to he a cost for me 
[to switch to a density-based rating 
system]. We ’re doing that already ” 
(Shipper).
Density pricing is generally understood by all 
three groups and there appears to be support for 
this method of pricing from many shippers and 
3PLs at least. However, the industry does not 
currently have an organization or a group 
committed to leading the change effort. As 
technology improves in the next few years, we 
believe the cost of capturing dimensional data 
will drop to a point where that particular barrier 
will be greatly reduced.
Theme 5: Industry Change Leadership
Many agree that the current LTL pricing system 
is confusing, inaccurate, outdated, antiquated, 
and in need of revision or replacement. But 
what do we change to and who leads the charge 
to the pricing promised land? It is clear any 
significant change to current LTL motor carrier
pricing practices will require leadership. What 
is less clear is who should lead the change 
process.
• “Carriers must lead the change 
process since they are the entities 
charging the price for their 
services. ” Those who sell 
transportation services are in the 
best position to change the pricing 
mechanisms and buyers will respond 
accordingly ” (Shipper).
• "It’s going to take some large 
shippers to take that lead, because 
from a carrier standpoint, we 're not 
ready to lead that and put in the cost 
of implementing something of that 
nature until it’s being asked for. ” 
(Carrier).
• “We are in the best position to 
change the pricing process and will 
need to drive any reengineering to 
the current pricing process "
(Carrier).
• “I think you could look at FedEx 
Freight and UPS Freight as taking 
the lead and for a couple reasons.
One, they 've got deeper pockets than 
anyone else does to invest in that 
research, and then secondly, they 
already have the knowledge of how 
they price that through the small 
package environment. ” (Carrier).
• “An industry consortium made up of 
all the major players and led by an 
independent entity like a professional 
organization would allow everyone 
to design a system that would be 
superior to the current system and 
hopefully mutually beneficial to all of 
the players ” (3 PL).
While general agreement seems to exist that 
some type of change to the current LTL pricing 
system is necessary, no consensus was evident
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regarding the leadership needed to push sueh a 
sweeping initiative forward. Many participants 
expressed an opinion on the leadership question, 
and while no clear support for a specific leader 
is found in the data, carriers as a group were the 
most frequently mentioned. However, the 
potential leader’s suggestions covered many 
options.
CONCLUSION
The nature of pricing in the LTL industry is 
unusual in that it hasn't evolved in any 
meaningful way during the three decades since 
deregulation occurred. The situation is highly 
unusual given the problems most study 
participants described with the current system, 
the overwhelming support for change to a 
different system, and the fact that studies from 
more than 20 years ago reported a similar dislike 
of the status quo at that time (e.g., Baker, 1991; 
Ying and Keeler, 1991). Clearly the lack of 
strong leadership needed to drive major change 
forward is lacking in the industry.
Challenges to any change initiative exist for the 
industry. Re-indexing, elimination of NMFC 
codes and density-based pricing are each 
alternatives that could be pursued independently 
or in combination. We believe the density 
option may present the best option for moving 
forward as most countries outside the U.S. 
already use some form of density pricing for LTL 
transportation. Further, the package 
transportation business is already based on a 
density pricing structure worldwide and two of 
the major players (FedEx and UPS) are based in 
the U.S.
Why hasn't the industry moved beyond a pricing 
model rooted in the regulated era? One reason is 
fear of renewed government interv ention. Many 
of the industry insiders we interviewed 
expressed concern that any type of collaborative 
industry consortium aimed at bringing 
participants together to examine possible 
alternatives to the current pricing mechanism 
would be improperly perceived as collusion.
Given that the history of motor carriage has a 
strong regulated component and carriers are now 
enjoying the benefits of operating in a 
deregulated environment, many industry insiders 
are hesitant to do anything that would be 
perceived as a violation of anti-trust laws or any 
type of behavior considered to be anti­
competitive in nature. Overcoming this fear 
may have to wait on the retirement of this 
generation of LTL leaders that retain memories 
of the deregulation experience. Another risk 
constraining the industry is concern that being an 
early adopter of any new pricing strategy could 
backfire. Many leaders see such a change as a 
“bet the company” strategy, and as sueh, a risk 
not worth taking.
We believe the industry will begin to move 
toward a density-based pricing model by the end 
of this decade. But, a change agent is needed to 
lead the way. We anticipate this change agent 
may emerge in one or a combination of the 
following three forms.
• Government policy. A major pricing 
revolution in the motor carrier 
industry may require government 
intervention. This would most likely 
come in a couple of ways. First, it 
could come in the form of a 
government assurance and 
accompanied by guidelines that an 
industry collaboration dealing with 
the pricing topic, if handled properly, 
would not cause concerns about anti­
competitive behavior. Government 
involvement could also come in the 
form of support and direction from an 
already existing transportation 
regulatory body since carriers 
regularly have to deal with various 
government entities focused on motor 
carriers.
• Industry consortium. Many 
interviewees we spoke with indicated 
a desire to have an industry 
consortium of some type lead the
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pricing revolution. Many felt that a 
variety of industry constituent groups 
(e.g., carriers, shippers, 3PLs and 
others) should have input into the 
evolutionary process for motor carrier 
pricing. It was suggested by several 
study participants that professional 
organizations serving the motor 
carrier and shipper industries could 
play a vital role in developing and 
managing a broad consortium of 
industry participants from various 
constituent groups.
• A powerful transportation firm.
Other participants indicated a large 
organization perceived to be a leader 
in the industry could drive pricing 
change efforts. Several individuals 
who indicated a large industry leader 
must serve as a change agent felt it 
would require new pricing behavior 
from a large transportation provider 
to alter the pricing landscape. The 
general belief is that a large 
transportation provider would have 
the clout to change the pricing 
mechanism for the industry and have 
other industry participants follow.
While ten years may appear to be a long time to 
wait in a business context, the basics of LTL 
pricing have not changed in the three decades 
following deregulation. This is due in part to 
fear of government intervention - although few 
of the “old timers” that worked in the industry 
when it was regulated remain, the industry has a 
long memory and many of the participants 
mentioned a concern that government action 
could result if any changes were deemed to be 
anti-competitive or monopolistic. Beyond the 
fear of government involvement, we believe it 
will still take several years to work out the 
leadership challenge.
Qualitative research can provide deeper 
understanding of a subject and establish a 
direction for future investigations into an area of
interest. We believe the qualitative approach 
used in this study has shed new light on the 
under-explored topic of LTL pricing. All study 
findings are preliminary, and certainly our 
conclusions are tentative and require follow-up 
using other methods and larger samples before 
they should be generalized to any extent. We 
hope the analysis offered, while perhaps not 
immediately testable, can serve to drive further 
research in this area and lead to research that re­
visits these topics in a few years.
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ABSTRACT
The early experience of the airline industry under deregulation was very much as expected, with 
increased competition and new entrants offering highly competitive rates. However, there are 
approximately 130 airlines operating today, and the industry remains more heavily concentrated than 
it was prior to deregulation. This study reports on concentration in the US airline industry between 
1970 and 2009, as measured by the Hcrfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and Concentration Ratio, 
together with changes in industry costs. The results show a trend of industry-wide reduced costs per 
available seat mile that is negatively correlated with the increased level of industry output over the 
last 30 years and increased concentration, which demonstrate the need for more research into the 
question of scale economies in air transportation.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to passing the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978, members of Congress wanted to be 
assured that eliminating federal economic 
regulation would result in neither destructive 
competition, nor increased concentration within 
the industry, which could lead to the threat of 
monopoly abuse or increased prices. Research 
presented before Congress provided a very 
convincing argument that neither condition 
would develop (U.S. Senate, 1975; U.S. House, 
1976; White, 1979; Kyle and Phillips, 1985; 
Antoniou, 1991). Moreover, since there was no 
investment in the way required, entry was 
believed to be relatively easy due to low capital 
requirements and the flexibility with which 
equipment could be acquired, reassigned, and/or 
retired (Harper, 1982; Levine, 1987; Dempsey, 
1993). This belief of easy entry was reinforced 
by the concept of Contestable Markets, which 
suggested that the potential threat of entry could 
keep prices down, even in markets with only one 
competitor (Baumol, Bailey, and Willig, 1977; 
Panzar and Willig, 1977; Bailey and Panzar, 
1981). Thus, Congress passed the 1978 
legislation with the belief that it would bring
about an increase in the number of competitors 
and a decrease in the level of industry 
concentration, leading to lower rates and better 
service throughout the airline industry.
The early experience after deregulation was very 
much as expected. There was a rush of new 
entrants into the market, rates became highly 
competitive, and the industry became less 
concentrated. In 1978, there were 33 airlines 
serving U.S. markets (A4A, 1979). In 1979, the 
first year after deregulation, 18 new carriers 
entered the market and another 13 entered the 
following year. By 1985, there were 106 airlines 
operating scheduled service in the US. (A4A, 
1986). By the end of the decade, however, many 
of the new carriers had exited the market and the 
industry was more concentrated than ever (Kahn, 
1988; Borenstein, 1992; Rakowski and Bejou, 
1992; Dempsey, 1993; Brucckner and Spiller, 
1994; Goetz and Sutton, 1997). This led Alfred 
Kahn, former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board and one of the strongest proponents of 
deregulation, to question the outcome of the 
1978 legislation (Kahn, 1988). Others actually 
called for re-regulation of the industry
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(McGinley, 1989; Dempsey, 1990; Nomani and 
Barrett, 1990). However, there was continued 
belief in the positive results of deregulation and 
strong support for the new environment 
(Gattuso, 1986; GAO, 1991; TRB, 1991), so no 
action was taken.
Throughout the 1990s, the trend toward fewer, 
larger carriers continued due to bankruptcies and 
mergers (TRB, 1999; DOT, 2001); however, new 
competitors continued to enter the market, and 
the overall number of carriers increased. By 
1997, there were 99 airlines servicing U.S. 
markets (A4A, 1998), compared to just 66 in 
1991 (A4A, 1992). With the new millennium 
came additional carriers, and in 2003, 150 
airlines were providing service to U.S. markets 
(A4A, 2004). As mergers and bankruptcies 
reduced the number of carriers, they were 
replaced in part by new ones. In 2004, there 
were only 139 carriers, but by 2008 the number 
was back up to 150 (A4A, 2006, 2009). Still, 
questions regarding concentration in the airline 
industry have continued, together with persistent 
calls for re-regulation (Senate, 2001; Staff, 2001; 
USDOJ, 2001; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; 
Lowy, 2010).
Increasing levels of industry concentration seem 
contradictory to increasing numbers of 
competitors, but studies noting levels of industry 
concentration have not been published recently. 
Yet levels from the late 1980s and early 1990s 
appear to remain valid since complaints against 
the industry continue to link bankruptcies and 
merger activity to industry concentration and 
“unreasonable” fares and poor service (GAO, 
2006; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; Lowy,
2010). However, questions arise as to whether 
these concerns are justified. Moreover, it is 
important to know whether the levels of 
concentration in the airline industry have 
continued to increase, or if the new carriers 
entering the market in recent years have led to 
reductions.
This study reports on changes in industry 
concentration in the U.S. airline industry
between 1975 and 2009. This study also reports 
on changes in industry costs and revenues over 
this period. The following section provides a 
brief overview of the two most popular measures 
of industry concentration, those used in this 
study, and a review of previous studies of 
concentration in the airline industry. This is 
followed by a description of the data, and then 
the results of the analysis are presented. Finally, 
conclusions and suggestions for future research 
are discussed.
MEASURING INDUSTRY 
CONCENTRATION
The concept of industrial concentration has been 
studied extensively over the years, and many 
measures have been proposed. Bikker and Haaf 
(2002) reviewed 10 different measures that had 
been used in studies of concentration in the 
banking industry. The two most common 
measures include basic concentration ratios (CR) 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
These measures are discussed briefly below, and 
this is followed by a brief review of studies of 
industry concentration in the U.S. airline 
industry.
Concentration Ratios
Basie concentration ratios (CRk) measure the 
proportion of industry revenue earned by the k 
largest firms in the industry. The most frequently 
used values of k are 4 and 8, providing the four- 
firm (CR4) and eight-firm (CR ) measures, 
respectively (Bain, 1951, 1954; Scherer and 
Ross, 1990; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Snyman, 
2010). Basic concentration ratios are seen as 
inferior to other measures of concentration, such 
as HHI, because they don't take into account the 
behavior of any firms other than the four or eight 
largest. Also, many different distributions of 
those largest firms would result in equivalent 
measures of CR4 and CRs. Despite these 
shortcomings, concentration ratios have been 
found to correlate highly with the HHI (Scherer 
and Ross, 1990) and continue to be used. 
Economists researching concentration ratios 
have predominately looked for critical values of 
measures that are positively correlated with
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higher profitability (Schmalensee, 1987; Bikker 
and Haaf, 2002). The idea being that when large 
firms begin to behave as an oligopoly, their 
profitability tends to increase because the large 
firms can easily see what their competitors are 
charging and charge a similar amount. Several 
different numbers have been proposed as the 
critical value, but for Clothe critical value 
generally is considered to be between 45 and 55 
percent, and for CR it is between 60 and 70 
percent (Bain, 1951; Meehan and Duchesneau, 
1973; Dalton and Penn, 1976).
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the 
sum of the squared market shares for each firm 
in a given industry (Rhoades, 1993; Naucnberg, 
Basil and Chand, 1997; Bikker and Haaf, 2002). 
This gives proportionally greater weight to firms 
with large market shares and “reflects both the 
distribution of the market shares of the top four 
firms and the composition of the market outside 
the top four firms” (Rhoades, 1993; USDOJ, 
1997).
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is 
generally accepted as a better measure of 
industry concentration than basic CRs, and it is 
the measure used by the U.S. Department of 
Justice (USDOJ) in determining whether a 
proposed merger deserves further investigation 
before approval (USDOJ, 1997). The HHI 
ranges from 0 to 10,000 for industries ranging 
from perfect competition to monopoly. As an 
example, an industry with four firms with the 
following market shares (40, 30, 20, and 10) 
would have a CR4 of 100% and a HHI of 3,000. 
If the industry was more concentrated, as with 
the following market shares (80, 10, 5, and 1), 
the CR, would still be 100%, but the HHI would 
be 6,526. Finally, for a monopoly the CR4 would 
still be 100%, but the HHI would be 10,000.
According to the guidelines set forth by the 
USDOJ and the Federal Trade Commission, an 
industry with an HHI lower than 1,000 is 
considered un-concentrated, and mergers need 
not be analyzed. An industry with an HHI
between 1,000 and 1,800 is considered 
moderately concentrated and mergers that create 
an increase in HFII greater than 100 points raise 
competitive concerns and need to be approved. 
Finally, an industry with an HHI greater than 
1,800 is considered highly concentrated, and 
mergers causing an increase of greater than 50 
points raise competitive concerns (USDOJ, 
1997). As with concentration ratios, the HFII can 
be measured using market shares expressed in 
either dollar terms or physical terms, such as 
units sold or revenue passenger miles (RPM).
STUDIES OF AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
CONCENTRATION
By the end of the first decade of deregulation, it 
was clear that the industry was changing 
dramatically. This prompted a wave of research 
assessing the results of deregulation. Several 
studies analyzed the effects of mergers and 
concentration on fares at the route-level or at 
airports/hubs (Hurdle et al., 1989; Borenstein, 
1990, 1991, 1992; Joesch and Zick, 1990; 
Morrison and Winston, 1990; Abramowitz and 
Brown, 1993; Kim and Singal, 1993). These 
studies revealed mixed results, such that in some 
cases fares were lower in heavily concentrated 
markets and in others fares were higher. What 
was revealed was that other factors must be 
considered together with the level of 
concentration. Others studies challenged the 
Theory of Contestable Markets, noting that firms 
may prevent entry of new carriers without 
lowering prices. This could be accomplished by 
development of Hub-and-Spoke Systems, 
Frequent Flyer Programs, Computerized 
Reservation Systems, Travel Agent Commission 
Overrides, and control at "Fortress Hubs” of 
airport slots and gates (Levine, 1987;
Borenstein, 1989, 1992; Fawcett and Farris,
1989; Hurdle ct al., 1989; Evans and Kessides, 
1993b; Joesch and Zick, 1994).
Very few studies reported concentration at the 
industry level, and most of these studies were 
conducted during the wave of research that 
assessed the effects of deregulation at the end of 
the first decade of experience; very little
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attention has been given to industry-level of 
concentration in recent years. Rakowski and 
Bejou (1992) showed that in 1977, the largest 15 
airlines controlled over 95 percent of the market 
in terms of passenger revenues. The largest 8 
controlled nearly 80 percent, and the largest four 
controlled over half. By 1985, those numbers 
were down to 91, 71, and 41, respectively. 
However, by 1989 the concentration ratios were 
back up above 1977 levels with the largest 15 
carriers controlling 99 percent, the largest 8 with 
over 91 percent, and the largest 4 at nearly 55 
percent.
Borenstein (1992) reported the CR4, CRS, and 
HHI for 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1990. The 4-firm 
ratios were 56.2, 54.2, 64.8, and 61.5, for 1977, 
1982, 1987, and 1990, respectively. The 8-firm 
ratios were 81.1, 80.4, 86.5, and 90.5, for those 
same years, and the HHIs were 1060, 930, 1230, 
and 1210, respectively. Evans and Kessides 
(1993a) reported measures of concentration for 
the fourth quarters of 1978-1988. The CR4 
decreased from the 4th quarter of 1978 to a low 
of 38.4 by the 4th quarter of 1985; however by 
the 4th quarter of 1988, it was back up to 45.5. 
The CRX fell from 77.6 in 1978 to a low of 40.7 
in 1985 and then increased to 78.0, its highest 
level up to that point. The HHI fell from 930 in 
the 4th quarter of 1978 to a low of 630 in 1985, 
and rose steadily through 1988 to 870.
Brueckncr and Spiller (1994) showed a similar 
pattern of change in industry concentration as 
measured by Revenue Passenger Miles. They 
reported the CR4 as 59.1, 53.6, and 59.1 for 
1979, 1985, and 1988, respectively. Clearly, the 
pattern was well established. The initial response 
to deregulation was the entry of several new 
carriers and more extensive competition, but by 
the end of the decade, most of the new carriers 
were gone, and the industry was more heavily 
concentrated than it was prior to deregulation. 
Mergers and bankruptcies have continued to 
raise the ire of consumers and public policy 
makers (Senate, 2001; Staff, 2001; US DOT, 
2001; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; Lowy,
2010), but little is known about the actual levels
of concentration in the industry and its 
relationship to overall fare levels and costs.
DATA
The data used in this analysis were obtained 
from the annual reports published by the Airlines 
for America (A4A). These reports, dating back 
to 1937, report information on the general state 
of the industry such as total revenue, expenses, 
revenue passenger miles (RPM), available seat 
miles (ASM), and names of all U.S. carriers with 
scheduled passenger service. In addition to this 
industry-wide information, similar financial and 
production information is reported for the largest 
carriers each year dating back to 1970 (A4A, 
2009). Table 1 provides an overview of the U.S. 
airline industry with respect to the number of 
carriers, total passenger revenue, operating profit 
and four measures of industry concentration for 
the past 40 years. To show trends in pricing and 
cost data, it was necessary to adjust dollar 
figures for inflation. This was accomplished by 
dividing by the implicit price deflator (IPD) as 
reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2011). The specific IPD used was based on 
annual GDP with a base year of 2005.
NUMBER OF CARRIERS
An expected result of airline deregulation was an 
increase in the number of carriers serving the 
U.S. scheduled passenger service market 
because of reduced barriers to entry. Figure 1 
shows that the number of carriers has increased 
dramatically since deregulation. Between 1978 
and 1985, there was a significant increase in the 
number of carriers with new entrants into the 
market; however, during that period there were 
also many small carriers that exited the market. 
By 1985, 9 of the 34 airlines that existed in 1978 
and 11 of the 17 that entered the market in 1979 
had exited the market. The number of carriers 
peaked in 1985, declined through 1991, and has 
trended upward through 2009 with a few minor 
declines.
With this significant growth in the number of 
carriers, one would expect to see a 
corresponding decrease in the concentration of
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TABLE 1:
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
Year Number
of
Carriers
Passenger
Revenue
(S Billions)
Operating
Profit
(S Billions)
RPM
(Billions)
ASM
(Billions)
CR4 CR8 Mill Gini
Index
1970 39 31.3 0.2 131.7 264.9 57 83 1,076 78
1971 36 32.2 1.2 135.7 279.9 56 82 1,037 76
1972 34 34.9 2.2 152.4 287.4 57 83 1,056 75
1973 35 36.5 2.1 162.0 310.6 54 83 1,024 76
1974 33 38.7 2.4 162.9 297.0 53 83 1,015 74
1975 34 36.8 0.3 162.8 303.0 53 82 995 74
1976 36 40.2 2.0 179.0 322.8 53 82 992 76
1977 34 43.1 2.4 193.2 345.6 52 81 978 74
1978 34 46.5 3.4 226.8 358.8 53 81 1,004 74
1979 50 52.0 0.5 262.0 416.0 50 79 901 81
1980 61 58.7 -0.5 254.2 431.2 49 80 920 83
1981 86 58.5 -0.8 248.8 432.5 47 76 853 87
1982 93 55.1 -1.3 259.0 424.9 47 77 854 87
1983 95 56.8 0.5 281.3 463.4 48 76 860 86
1984 95 61.8 3.6 304.5 514.0 46 74 817 86
1985 106 63.7 2.3 335.9 547.0 45 73 782 88
1986 98 63.6 2.1 366.3 606.8 48 74 833 87
1987 93 69.3 3.8 404.3 648.4 51 84 989 90
1988 77 75.4 5.2 423.3 648.7 53 85 1,027 89
1989 71 77.2 2.7 432.7 684.4 57 87 1,094 89
1990 67 80.9 -2.6 457.9 733.4 57 88 1,111 89
1991 66 76.2 -2.4 447.8 715.0 63 90 1.230 89
1992 70 78.0 -3.1 478.1 751.8 69 94 1,407 92
1993 80 81.7 1.8 489.1 770.8 69 93 1,407 92
1994 88 81.1 3.5 518.2 783.8 68 91 1,347 92
1995 95 85.1 7.2 540.4 806.6 67 89 1,312 92
1996 97 88.2 7.5 578.4 834.7 66 89 1,280 92
1997 99 93.9 10.2 605.4 860.6 66 89 1,278 92
1998 98 94.6 10.9 619.5 874.2 65 89 1,273 92
1999 94 96.9 9.1 651.6 917.8 64 89 1,233 92
2000 96 105.5 8.0 692.5 956.5 62 88 1,185 91
2001 100 89.2 -11.1 651.7 930.5 64 89 1,244 92
2002 141 79.5 -9.3 639.6 892.7 62 87 1,185 93
2003 150 81.8 -2.3 655.9 893.9 58 83 1,069 92
2004 140 88.5 -1.4 731.9 969.0 57 81 1,029 91
2005 139 93.4 0.3 779.0 1,003.3 55 83 1,028 91
2006 141 98.0 7.3 797.4 1,006.4 54 82 1,007 92
2007 151 100.7 8.7 829.0 1.037.1 53 81 968 91
2008 150 102.8 -3.3 81 1.4 1,020.1 61 83 1,188 92
2009 130 83.2 2.2 769.5 952.2 60 83 1,157 92
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FIGURE 1:
NUMBER OF U.S. AIRLINES 1975-2009
the industry and equality of carriers' market 
share, especially if there were no economies of 
scale. That is, if all carriers, regardless of size, 
had the same costs per unit of output, the 
concentration today should be lower than the 
concentration was in 1975 because the new 
entrants into the market would be able to take 
significant amounts of market share from the 
industry leaders. This is not the case, however, 
and the following sections will illustrate that 
industry concentration and inequality has 
actually increased over this time period.
CONCENTRATION RATIOS
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the 
annual four and eight firm concentration ratios 
calculated using market shares measured in both 
dollar sales and units sold between 1975 and 
2009 as well as the most conservative (highest) 
critical values of CRS and the range of critical 
values for CR4. From this figure, it is obvious 
that the airline industry is currently operating 
above these critical values and has been for most 
of, if not all of, the past 35 years. This suggests 
that the industry is behaving as an Oligopoly and 
is a highly concentrated industry. This can be 
further verified by the fact that ticket prices for 
the same lane among the largest airlines are
generally very similar, and when checked 
baggage fees were added in 2009 they were 
added for all of the largest airlines, with the 
exception of Southwest Airlines, which, as of 
2011, doesn't charge a checked baggage fee but 
frequently charges slightly higher ticket prices 
than the other major national airlines. 1 lowever, 
an industry behaving as an oligopoly should 
have higher profitability (Bikker and Haaf, 
2002), and this is not the case in the U.S. airline 
industry, where industry profits per unit of 
output have remained fairly constant over the 
past 40 years.
HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX
Figure 3 shows the HHI calculated annually for 
the U.S. airline industry from market shares 
measured in terms of both dollar sales and units 
sold. Both methods result in measures of Hill 
that are very similar at every point in the sample. 
This illustrates that the airline industry is 
moderately concentrated and has been for most 
of the past 35 years. It is also clear that when the 
number of carriers was increasing, between 1978 
and 1985, the concentration of the industry was 
decreasing. However, when the number of 
carriers began decreasing between 1985 and 
1991, the concentration increased rapidly, and
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FIGURE 2:
ANNUAL CR4 AND CRs of U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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did not decrease dramatically as more carriers 
later began to enter the market. Therefore, 
despite the fact that there are between 4 and 5 
times as many carriers today as there were in 
1978, the HHI is actually higher. The large firms 
have increased their market share and the small 
firms are dividing a decreasing percentage of the 
market between them. This indicates that there is 
some reason the large firms are able to increase 
their power, whether it is due to economies of 
scale, scope, or density.
INEQUALITY
When discussing industry concentration, it 
makes sense to also discuss the related concept 
of inequality of the distribution of market share 
of the firms in the industry. A common way to 
measure inequality is the Gini index (Damgaard 
and Weiner, 2000). The Gini index is based on 
Pareto’s law and is the ratio of the area between 
a diagonal representing equal distribution and 
the Lorenz curve and the area below a diagonal 
representing equal distribution. In the Lorenz 
curve, individuals are ranked by size, and the 
cumulative percentage of carriers is plotted on 
the x-axis against the corresponding cumulative 
percentage of the market on the y-axis. In figure 
4, the Lorenz curve for the U.S. airline industry 
in 2009,
To make computation easier and avoid the 
estimation of a formula for the Lorenz curve, the 
following formula is an unbiased estimator of 
the Gini index if the carriers are ranked by size 
(Damgaard and Weiner, 2000), wherex. is the 
size or market share of each carrier and // is the 
average size of all carriers.
(2)
Figure 5 shows the Gini index tor the U.S. 
airline industry for the past forty years calculated 
using size measured in both passenger revenue 
and RPM. This shows that inequality in the 
industry increased significantly immediately 
following deregulation and has continued to do
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so. If there was no benefit to being a larger 
carrier (no returns to scale or scope), we would 
expect to see the industry approaching a more 
equitable distribution of the market when in fact 
the opposite has been the case. Furthermore, the 
correlation between the Gini index and number 
of carriers is 0.8165, indicating that as the 
number of carriers increases so does the 
inequality in market share between carriers.
These multiple measures of industry 
concentration and inequality were examined to 
clearly illustrate that the concentration of the 
U.S. airline industry has been increasing since 
deregulation despite the fact that there has been 
a substantial increase in the number of firms. 
While this alone, does not indicate economies of 
scale or scope, it certainly raises questions as to 
how the largest firms have been able to maintain 
control of the marketplace and actually increase 
market share w ith the near constant introduction 
of new competitors. One possible explanation 
might be that operating costs per unit of output 
are actually lower for the larger carriers. If this 
explanation is accurate, it would indicate the 
presence of economies of scale, economies of 
scope, or both in the airline industry.
COSTAND REVENUE PER PASSENGER 
MILE (RPM)
Since 1975, there has been an increase in the 
size of the airline industry as a whole. This can 
be measured by revenue (dollar sales). RPM 
(unit sales), or ASM (output). All three measures 
have shown an increasing trend since 1975 and 
can be seen in Figure 6. In order to fit data of 
differing scales on the same graph and show the 
increasing trends more clearly, revenue, RPM, 
and ASM have been indexed with a base year of 
1975 by dividing each year’s value by the value 
from 1975. The revenue values were adjusted for 
inflation before being indexed. Figure 6 clearly 
shows an increasing trend in the size of the U.S. 
airline industry, but it also shows that output and 
units sold have been increasing more rapidly 
than revenue. This is another indication of scale 
economies and shows that costs have risen less 
quickly than output.
FIGURE 4:
CALCULATION OF THE GINI INDEX
FIGURE 5:
GINI INDEX OF U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Figure 7 shows the increase in billions of RPM 
sold for what are, as of 2010, the three largest 
airlines in the U.S. (United, American, and 
Delta) for each year between 1975 and 2009. 
This figure illustrates that not only has the entire 
industry been increasing in size, but the largest 
firms have also been increasing. Figure 7 also 
shows that the period from 1979-1985 resulted 
in a relative lack of growth for these three 
carriers while the industry as a whole was 
growing. This lack of growth for the large 
carriers as the industry grew corresponds to what 
was shown in figures 1-3, that the number of 
firms increased in this time period and the 
industry concentration, as measured by CR4,
CRS, and HHI, decreased.
Correlated to the growth of the industry was an 
equally impressive decrease in both expenses 
and revenue per RPM and ASM. This can be 
seen in Figure 8. This figure is based on 
monetary figures, which were adjusted for 
inflation by dividing each year’s observation by
the corresponding I PD. This is another indicator 
that economies of scale or scope may exist in the 
airline industry. The correlation between 
industry output (measured in either RPM or 
ASM) and expenses per RPM is -0.86.
However, the fact that revenue per unit of output 
has decreased at nearly the same rate indicates 
that the carriers do not appear to be acting as 
though they are market leaders in a concentrated 
industry. Actually, the correlation between sales 
per RPM and output is even higher at -0.96, 
indicating that the price of air travel has 
decreased more quickly than the cost of 
providing air travel. For those interested in re­
regulation, this raises the question of whether the 
current state of the industry and competition is 
bad for the consumer. Presumably the role of 
regulation would be to help the consumer and 
maintain competitiveness in the industry. 
However, the industry seems to be lowering 
prices even faster than expenses, suggesting that 
competition is keeping prices low despite high 
levels of industry concentration.
FIGURE 6:
ANNUAL INDEXED MEASURES OF INDUSTRY SIZE (1970=1)
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FIGURE 7:
ANNUAL RPM (BILLIONS) OF 2009’s 3 LARGEST CARRIERS
2000
United
FIGURE S:
REVENUE, EXPENSES, AND PROFIT PER REVENUE PASSENGER MILE
0.10 -
5 7.000 7009
Operating Revenue per RPM
Operating Profit per RPM
75 1980 19X5
Passenger Revenue per RPM
Operating Expense per RPM
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The bottom line on Figure 8 illustrates the profit 
per RPM, and this measure has stayed fairly 
stable over the past 35 years. In fact, the entire 
industry lost money 11 out of the past 35 years.
If this is a result of destructive competition, 
there may be a need for regulation simply to 
keep the large carriers from losing money or 
requiring governmental monetary intervention to 
avoid bankruptcy. The entire industry has lost 
approximately $9 Billion since 2001. However, 
this is more likely the result of a few large firms 
losing a lot of money rather than all of the major 
carriers losing money. Based on information 
from their annual reports to the SEC, America 
West and U.S. Airways combined, pre-merge, 
and post merge losses since 2001 have totaled 
close to $8 Billion, leading to the conclusion that 
the rest of the industry only lost $1 Billion; this 
includes at least 40 bankruptcies, with at least 12 
of the bankruptcies resulting in the cessation of 
operations.
These findings support reregulation of the airline 
industry in that they provide evidence of 
economies of scale, and a major reason for 
deregulation was a multitude of studies showing 
a lack of scale economies in the industry. The 
industry has concentration ratios indicating that 
it should be behaving as an oligopoly, all 
measures of concentration show increased 
concentration ratios since deregulation, and cost 
per unit of output has steadily decreased as 
output has increased. Contrary to this evidence is 
the fact that price per unit of output has 
decreased even faster than costs. This reduced 
price is beneficial to consumers as long as 
destructive competition does not drive prices 
down so far that the established carriers are 
forced out of business. However, it has been 
pointed out that the majority of industry losses 
over the past 9 years have been the result of two 
carriers who merged.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
The final piece of evidence that there may be 
economies of scale in the U.S. airline industry is 
the recent abundance of mergers and 
acquisitions. If there are no cost benefits from
increased size of operations, why are there so 
many mergers? The following is an account of 
some of the recent mergers: American Airlines 
purchased the assets of the bankrupt Trans World 
Airlines in 2001. America West and U.S.
Airways (both with recent bankruptcies) merged 
in 2005 and integrated their operations in 2008. 
Delta and Northwest merged in 2008. United 
Airlines and Continental Airlines merged in 
October of 2010. ExpressJet Airlines merged 
with Sky West/ASA in November of 2010.
Finally, Southwest Airlines announced a merger 
with AirTran Airways in September of 2010 
which was finalized May 2, 2011.
While many carriers are merging operations, 
there are also several instances of a single 
holding company owning multiple carriers. This 
would further suggest that the carriers see no 
possibility of economies of scale. However, in 
some cases, these are the same companies that 
were previously mentioned. For example, Delta 
Airlines owns Comair and operates it separately; 
AMR Corporation owns American Airlines, 
American Eagle, and Executive Airlines; U.S. 
Airways Group owns U.S. Airways, Piedmont 
Airline, Inc., and PSA Airlines; and Republic 
Airline Holding owns Frontier, Republic, Shuttle 
America, Chatauqua, and Midwest. This 
indicates that mergers may not be attempts to 
exploit economies of scale but may be due to 
some other rationale.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper is intended to investigate the state of 
the airline industry, show its increasing level of 
concentration, and point out the need for further 
investigation into the existence of scale 
economies. Whether industry concentration is 
measured by concentration ratios or the HHI, the 
U.S. airline industry has been increasing in 
concentration while also increasing in size and 
number of carriers. The fact that large carriers 
can increase market share in the presence of 
increased competition seems to suggest the 
existence of scale economies. Costs per unit of 
output have been steadily decreasing as industry 
output and output of the largest carriers has
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increased. This is yet another indicator that scale 
economies may exist. Finally, some air carriers 
behave as though they will see a benefit from 
merging with other carriers, indicating a belief or 
hope that scale economies exist, while other 
companies own multiple carriers without 
merging operations, indicating that they see no 
benefit from increasing the size of operations.
For this reason alone, it may be time to 
reinvestigate the existence of scale economies in 
the U.S. airline industry, so airline holding 
companies will know if they could expect to see 
reduced cost from merging operations instead of 
operating multiple carriers.
For all of these reasons, the apparent shifts in 
market structure as seen by changes in equality 
in Figure 5, and the recent calls for re-regulation; 
it seems as though there exists a need for further 
investigation into the presence or absence of 
economies of scale and scope in the U.S. airline 
industry. Further validating this argument, is the 
fact that the most recently published study into 
this matter, while published in 2001, used data 
from 1983-1989 (Creel and Farrell, 2001). This 
means that an additional 20 years of available 
data has not been included in any previous 
studies on scale economies in the U.S. airline 
industry. It is time for a thorough study using the 
most up to date information to investigate the 
existence of economies of scale, scope, and 
density.
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ABSTRACT
This paper builds upon a resource based view of competitive advantage under a dynamic capabilities 
construct. Fuel efficiency measurement in the aviation industry can be incorporated into dynamic 
capabilities such as strategic decision making and alliancing. These dynamic capabilities can drive 
operational cost reductions, which in-turn can enhance profitability and establish a competitive 
advantage. To further this advantage, fuel efficiency can be embedded inside an organizational 
culture. A fuel efficiency focused organizational culture can be a valuable, rare, inimitable and non- 
substitutable resource. This paper proposes a model to merge the dynamic capabilities of strategic 
decision making and alliancing with organizational culture under fuel efficiency. Under this model, 
a fuel efficiency index is introduced to drive behavior and provide accountability. Effective use of 
the index has profit potential.
INTRODUCTION
A firm’s efficient utilization of resources can be 
a source of competitive advantage. For the 
aviation industry, the resource that makes up the 
largest component of total cost is fuel. Aviation 
industry fuel encompassed 20% of total costs in 
2007 and United Airlines saw their cost of fuel, 
as a percentage of total cost, vary between 10% 
and 25% from 1973 to 2006 (Mazraati, 2010). A 
dynamic capability to obtain the efficient use of 
fuel and reduce those costs could lead to a 
sustained competitive advantage.
Barney (1991) suggests a rationale for a resource 
based view of sustained competitive advantage. 
The two main assumptions of this view are that a 
firm’s resources are heterogeneous and that 
those resources may be immobile across firms.
In addition, resources that provide for a 
sustained competitive advantage must be 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable. 
Fuel is not rare or inimitable. Fuel as a resource 
therefore will not provide for a sustained 
competitive advantage. Yet, a firm's dynamic 
capabilities properly applied to fuel efficiency 
can achieve that advantage. Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) expanded upon Barney’s resource 
based view model by adding dynamic
capabilities as potential sources of sustained 
competitive advantage.
AVIATION FUEL EFFICIENCY AND 
DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
Dynamic capabilities as defined by Eisenhardt 
and Martin are those “‘organizational and 
strategic routines by which firms achieve new 
resource configurations as markets emerge, 
collide, split, evolve and die.” Some examples 
given of dynamic capabilities include alliancing, 
product development and strategic decision 
making. Eisenhardt and Martin suggest that 
dynamic capabilities can be a source of 
competitive advantage by altering a firm’s 
resource base. The efficient utilization of fuel in 
the aviation industry is dependent upon 
alliancing, product development and strategic 
decision making. A model for implementation of 
a fuel efficiency strategy can be seen in Figure 1.
The model's three elements — strategic decision 
making, supply chain fuel efficiency and an 
organizational culture of fuel efficiency directly 
impact a firm’s operational fuel efficiency. 
Strategic decision making concerning fuel 
efficiency involves strategic investment and 
strategic planning. Strategic investment
Fall/Wintcr 2011 75
FIGURE 1
AVIATION INDUSTRY FUEL EFFICIENCY MODEL
involves the acquisition of aircraft, software, 
ground equipment and infrastructure 
improvements. Examples of each of these 
categories can be seen in Table 1. The critical 
factor in all of these strategic elements is to 
consider their fuel efficiency impact on 
operations. This impact is associated with a 
purchased item’s fuel efficiency and weight. 
Strategic investments need to consider weight 
minimization as an important requirement. 
Strategic planning involves location 
management and process decisions. Location 
management decisions include the basing of 
aircraft, ground equipment, facilities and 
maintenance repair capability. The goal of 
location management is to optimize requirement 
How with minimum fuel usage. Process 
decisions include initial process design for fuel 
efficiency, process redesign for fuel efficiency 
and accountability for fuel efficiency. Metrics 
need to be designed to drive behaviors that 
increase fuel efficiency in these strategic areas.
Supply chain fuel efficiency involves alliancing. 
Partnering with other firms in the supply chain
can result in significant fuel efficiency 
enhancements. Examples include information 
technology collaboration that shares aircraft 
schedules and loads with cargo distribution 
centers to optimize load factors. Another 
potential improvement area in alliancing fuel 
efficiency comes from the increased load factors 
associated with pooling. Pooling involves 
sharing requirements to optimize load factors. 
Gagnepain and Marin (2007) conclude that 
airline alliances are able to lower prices because 
they result in lower costs.
Organizational culture is not a dynamic 
capability, but meets the valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable requirements of 
a resource based view. Barney (1986) suggests 
that organizational culture may be a source for 
sustained competitive advantage. Achieving a 
fuel efficiency focused organizational culture 
involves the integration of the importance of fuel 
efficiency as a core ingredient to the success of 
the organization. Embedding fuel efficiency into 
an organizational culture is difficult (Hatch, 
1993).
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TABLE 1
AVIATION INDUSTRY STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING FOR FUEL EFFICIENCY
Strategic Decision Making
Strategic Investment Strategic Planning
Aircraft
Acquisition
Automation and 
Optimization 
Softwa re 
Acquisition
Ground
Equipment
Acquisition
Infrastructure
Improvements
Location
Management
Process
More Fuel 
Efficient Engines Route and
Schedule 
Optimization for 
Enterprise 
Requirements at
Minimum Cost of
Fuel and Assets
Mission Handling 
Equipment Fuel 
Efficiency
Strengthening a 
Runway to 
Increase Load
Factors
Aircraft Basing Initial Process 
Design for Fuel 
EfficiencyLighter Materials 
and Components
Ground Equipment 
Locations
Enhanced
Aerodynamics Mission Support 
Equipment Fuel 
Efficiency
Lengthening a 
Runway to
Increase Load
Factors
Facility Locations
Process Redesign 
for Fuel Efficiency
Optimal Fleet Mix 
for Fuel Efficiency
Maintenance Repai 
Capability
Accountability for 
Fuel Efficiency
Schein (1984) stressed the importance of the 
structure of the firm and the firm’s reward 
system during the development of organizational 
culture. The process to embed fuel efficiency 
into the culture requires measuring individual 
contribution to fuel efficiency and then 
establishing mechanisms that utilize that 
contribution element as an important 
consideration for promotion/reward. Leadership 
involvement is also critical toward embedding 
fuel efficiency in the organizational culture.
Fuel efficiency should be incorporated into 
leadership communications to employees. 
Organizationally, a top executive can be 
assigned to oversee a firm’s overall fuel 
efficiency effort. A committee can also be 
established among top executives to discuss 
strategic fuel efficiency opportunities.
Operational fuel efficiency can be greatly 
enhanced by fuel efficiency strategic decision 
making, supply chain fuel efficiency and an 
organizational culture committed to fuel 
efficiency. To align all of these sources of 
competitive advantage together requires fuel 
efficiency metrics. These metrics need to be 
measured, analyzed and reported to key decision 
makers. Accountability for metric performance 
must be established in terms of both individual
promotion/reward and fuel efficiency trends 
needing management attention. The metrics 
should be designed to influence positive 
behaviors and issues where negative behaviors, 
can positively impact a metric should be 
highlighted and widely acknowledged.
FUEL EFFICIENCY INDEX
Fuel efficiency metrics in the transportation 
industry are based upon several aggregate 
measures of output. In the aviation industry, the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics includes air 
revenue ton miles and air revenue passenger 
miles (Lahiri et al, 2003). Internationally, 
revenue ton kilometers and revenue passenger 
kilometers are used (Owen, 2008). Assuming an 
increase in these metrics is positive then 
increasing revenues, distances and load factors 
would result in a positive trend. The desired 
objective of fuel efficiency is to move the 
greatest quantity of cargo and passengers at the 
least cost of fuel for a given distance, set of 
assets and unit of time.
Ton miles and passenger miles should measure 
the Great Circle Distance (GCD) between cargo 
and passenger onload and offload as established 
in Federal Regulations (Code of Federal 
Regulations, 2010). Including GCD in the
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metric would allow the flight of more miles to 
save fuel overall. Flying greater distances can 
save fuel. Examples include flying farther to 
find more favorable winds or flying farther to 
obtain an Air Traffic Control routing that allows 
for a higher, more fuel efficient altitude. Ton 
miles and passenger miles still fail to take into 
account fuel, so those metrics should be divided 
by fuel used. The literature includes many 
examples where fuel is incorporated with 
passenger distance and cargo weight distance 
(Lee et al, 2004; Hileman et al, 2008; Owen, 
2008; Rutherford and Zcinali, 2009). Ton miles 
per lbs of fuel consumed and passenger miles 
per lbs of fuel consumed consider fuel and mass 
transported over a given distance.
Hileman et al (2008) labeled these metrics 
Payload Fuel Energy Efficiency (PFEE), but uses
fuel energy consumed instead of lbs of fuel 
consumed. This metric excels as an aggregate 
measure, but fails to take into account how an 
increasing quantity of sorties can tend to 
increase the measure of efficiency. For example, 
if two sorties are performed exactly the same, 
then the aggregate PFEE of both sorties is twice 
the size for the PFEE of one sortie. The reason 
for this is that both variables in Hileman et al’s 
metric numerator are doubled while only one 
term in the denominator is doubled. This effect 
of increasing efficiency by increasing sorties is 
eliminated by obtaining the sortie average. 
Including the number of sorties n in the 
denominator of PFEE operationalizes the Fuel 
Efficiency Index (FEI) metric as seen in 
equations (1) and (2).
TABLE 2
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND FEI BY MDS NOVEMBER 2010
Sorties
Great Circle 
Distance (Nautical 
Miles)
Cargo
(Tons)
Fuel
Consumed 
(1000 lbs)
Fuel Efficiency Index: 
(GCD* Cargo)/
(FC* Sorties)
C-17A 3110 4471385 54406.05 220724 .354
C-5A 74 133192 1781.5 8141 394
C-5B 251 542520 7494.2 31936 507
C-5M 4 10375 116.25 549 550
C-130E 317 64456 860.55 1661 105
C-130H 675 280850 2562.7 6492 164
C-130J 188 145918 8.31.45 2587 249
KC-10A 107 186420 288.95 14955 34
KC-135R 358 494280 459.05 26663 24
KC-135T 60 74927 49.1 5265 12
Total 5144 6404322.45 68849.8 318971 269
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THE DATA
Babikian ct al. (2001) demonstrated that 
efficiency differences between regional and large 
aircraft can be affected by sortie length. As the 
proportion of large and small aircraft changes 
over time, the overall FEI can be biased. To 
remove this bias, the FEI in equations (1) and (2) 
can be calculated on an aircraft type basis to 
remove the bias of different aircraft type ratios 
impacting the overall efficiency metric. To 
obtain a better understanding of the fuel 
efficiency index, 5,144 Air Mobility Command 
military airlift sorties from November 2010 were 
analyzed with respect to the proposed index.
Only channel, contingency or special assignment 
airlift mission sorties were selected. A summary 
of the index numbers broken down by aircraft 
Mission Design Series (MDS) can be seen in 
Table 2.
Note how the larger aircraft tend to have on 
average better FEI scores with the C-5M scoring 
highest. This trend for larger aircraft matches 
Babikian et al’s results. Tanker aircraft (KC-10 
and K.C-135) tend to have very low FEI scores 
due to the limited cargo they carry and also due 
to the fact that airlift is ancillary to their primary 
mission of air refueling. The overall efficiency 
numbers are at the lower end of their range due 
to the prevalence of sorties with no cargo. Of all 
the sorties observed, 22% had no cargo. Sorties 
at the top of the efficiency range had FEI 
measuring in the thousands. Table 3 includes the 
descriptive statistics for all of the FEIs.
From the descriptive statistics, note that the 
standard deviation is larger than the mean. This
suggests a large dispersal of the data. There are 
a few outliers at the top of the range that are 
associated with bad data. A couple of cases 
included diverts back to the origin, but failed to 
change the city pair. This resulted in extremely 
low fuel usage for a long distance resulting in a 
false FEI. In the cases of diverts, it is important 
to record the destination as the same as the 
origin. Finally, the mean is much larger than the 
median suggesting influence by a few outliers at 
the top of the range.
GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE
After examining the descriptive statistics of FEI, 
the data was analyzed to assess the impact of 
great circle distance. If greater distances lead to 
better FEIs, than shifting the fleet to more long 
distance missions might improve the FEI 
measure. Increased distance tends to decrease 
payload capacity. This can be seen in Brcguet 
Range equation (3) (Lee et al, 2004). V is the 
flight speed, L/D is the lift to drag ratio, g is the 
gravitational acceleration constant, SFC is 
specific fuel consumption and W is weight. The 
equation shows a tradeoff between fuel weight 
and payload weight.
If Air Mobility Command aircraft were operating 
at maximum payload, then as distance increases, 
payload decreases counteracting the increase in 
FEI. When not operating at maximum payload, 
similar payloads will result in a higher FEI for 
aircraft that move the cargo farther. To isolate 
the bias of differing MDS aircraft, the
TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR AIR MOBILITY COMMAND FEI
NOVEMBER 2010
Mean FEI 267.41
Standard Deviation 332.32
Minimum 0
Maximum 5188.57
Count 5144
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FIGURE 2
C-17 GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE AND FEI
FIGURE 3
C-5 GREAT CIRCLE DISTANCE AND FEI
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comparison of distance to FEI was made for the 
C-17 and the C-5. For the C-5, the A, B and M 
models were included together. The results were 
plotted in Figures 2 and 3.
Both of the plots show an increase in FEI for 
longer distance city pairs. The overall 
correlation between GCD and FEI is 44%. The 
only method that a manager could use to 
increase GCD is to overtly an intermediate 
location or discover longer distance city pairs to 
replace city pairs currently being used. If these 
sorties were operating at maximum payload 
before the transition, than a payload penalty 
would exist for going to longer distances. Yet, if 
the sorties were tlying with a suboptimal 
payload, then they could fly a longer range with 
the same payload and increase FEI.
LOAD FACTORS
To enhance the effectiveness of the FEI, it 
should be reported along with load factors. The 
benefit of the load factor is that it is a ratio of the 
actual load to the optimal load. This information 
provides important insight into how cargo 
loading efficiency influences FEI. Load factors 
can have two limiting factors. These factors 
include weight limitations and volume 
limitations. The volume limitation or cube is a 
matter of dimension. It is based on the surface 
area of the cargo floor and the height of the 
cargo door. It is often measured as a ratio of 
pallet positions used over pallet positions 
available. If a cargo compartment is cubed out 
(pallet positions used equals pallet positions 
available) and cargo of greater density is not 
available (assuming below payload maximum) 
then the horizontal optimal configuration was 
achieved. In order to achieve optimality for the 
vertical, a metric should be added for the load 
factor of the pallet. It should be noted that 
calculating pallet load factors could be complex 
if accuracy is a primary concern. To simplify 
pallet load factors, a ratio of the height of the 
pallet to the maximum allowable height might 
be preferable.
The weight limitation is more complex. Pallets 
and aircraft cargo floors have a weight 
limitation. The limits of these must be observed. 
The aircraft also has a maximum gross takeoff 
weight which is dependent upon several 
variables. The first constraint is an airframe 
limit. This airframe limit can be reduced based 
upon several variables. These variables include 
pavement strength, runway length, altitude, 
temperature, obstacles and runway winds. With 
the maximum gross weight for takeoff 
determined, cargo available equals maximum 
gross takeoff weight minus operating weight 
minus fuel on board. The fuel on board is a 
calculation based on many factors.
The primary factor is the distance to the next 
fueling point. Other considerations include 
icing, thunderstorms, weather at origin and 
destination, distance to alternate, airframe 
specific fuel degrade, cargo weight, routing, 
altitude and winds. Due to the complexity of all 
of these factors, determination of the exact 
maximum payload is extremely difficult and 
often requires iterative algorithms. Computer 
flight planning software can calculate the value 
of payload maximum (PM AX) and those values 
should be calculated and recorded for every 
sortie flown. For passengers, the load factor is 
based on percentage of seats filled. See 
equations (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) for load 
factors. The behaviors desired from these 
metrics include maximizing the pallet loads and 
completely filling the aircraft.
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Load factors for passengers in the aviation 
industry grew from 60 to 80% from 1990 to 
2008 and load factors for commercial cargo 
remained flat around 60% over the same time 
period (Hileman et al, 2008). To contrast against 
industry data, load factors for the Air Mobility 
Command data set were gathered. Payload 
maximum was determined using equation (9). 
Actual ramp fuel was used to aid in 
simplification, but operationally the load factors 
need to be determined before the ramp fuel is 
loaded. Payload maximum is not routinely used 
by Air Mobility Command’s command and
control staff, but its value is critical to accurate 
load factor determination during planning. 
Payload maximum is dependent on Maximum 
Gross Takeoff Weight. For the analysis, the 
Maximum Gross Takeoff Weight used was the 
maximum for the aircraft. Other variables that 
could further reduce Maximum Gross Takeoff 
Weight include airfield pavement strength 
limitations and departure obstacles. Their 
inclusion would serve to improve load factors. 
The cargo load factors for Air Mobility 
Command can be seen in Tabic 4. The Air 
Mobility Command cargo load factor is lower
TABLE 4
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND LOAD FACTOR NOVEMBER 2010
Maximum Gross 
Takeoff Weight Empty Weight Load Factors
C-17A 585 282.5 23%
C-5A 769 380 23%
C-5B 769 380 31%
C-5M 769 380 28%
C-130E 155 90 15%
C-13011 155 90 21%
C-130J 155 90 27%
KC-10A 590 241 3%
KC-135R 322.5 119.23 3%
KC-135T 322.5 119.23 2%
Total 22%
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FIGURE 4
C-17 LOAD FACTOR AND FEI
FIGURE 5
C-5 LOAD FACTOR AND FEI
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than industry by a factor of 3. This illustrates 
the need for the operationalization of the load 
factor metric into Air Mobility Command 
planning, command and control. Each sortie’s 
load factor needs to be highlighted when the 
value falls below a firm’s specific threshold. 
Load factor feedback control systems can have a 
positive impact on the fuel efficient operation of 
the enterprise.
Strategic airlift airframes were selected from the 
data for more detailed analysis. To better 
understand the impact of load factors on FEE 
load factors were plotted against FEI for both the 
C-17 and the C-5 as seen in Figures 4 and 5. In 
both cases, a positive correlation is seen between 
increasing load factors and the FEI. Overall, 
there exists a 74% correlation between load 
factor and FEI. This is almost twice as large as 
the 44% correlation with GCD. There are 
several data points outside 100% load factors. 
These are suspected to be due to waivers that 
allow for loading more cargo than Maximum 
Gross Takeoff Weight. One other item of note is 
the increasing variance of FEI as load factors
increase. This was also apparent in the 
analysis of GCD.
INACTIVE SORTIES
Aircraft often need to reposition to pick up 
cargo and deposition after delivering cargo. 
This reduces load factors by driving up the 
number of no cargo sorties. It also reduces 
FEI due to the zeroing of the numerator. 
Inactive sorties drive the desire to either stage 
aircraft out of heavy cargo and passenger 
requirement locations or to select aircraft that 
are nearest to the cargo and passenger 
requirement onload or offload locations. A 
metric that is proposed to handle the efficiency 
of aircraft selection to meet this requirement is 
inactive miles per inactive sortie as seen in 
equation (10). An inactive mile is defined as a 
mile flown to position an aircraft at a cargo 
onload location or to deposition an aircraft 
from a cargo offload location. An inactive 
sortie is a sortie composed of inactive miles. 
The behavior desired is to drive aircraft 
staging to where the cargo is located or to 
select an aircraft for a mission that is closest to 
the cargo onload and offload.
TABLE 5
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND INACTIVE MILES PER SORTIE NOVEMBER 2010
Inactive Sorties Inactive Miles Inactive Miles Per Sortie
C-17A 960 1186113 1236
C-5 A 33 27453 832
C-5B 98 129808 1325
C-5M 2 5188 2594
C-130E 40 18876 472
C-130H 49 47441 968
C-130J 31 29748 960
KC-10A 37 88638 2396
KC-135R 77 163989 2130
KC-135T 7 7493 1070
Average 1398
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Inactive Miles per Sortie = n
where n = # of inactive sorties
FIGURE 6
C-17 FUEL CONSUMED AND FEI
FIGU RE 7
C-5 FUEL CONSUMED AND FEI
(10)
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The results of the inactive miles per sortie 
analysis on an MDS basis for Air Mobility 
Command can be seen in Table 5. The tankers 
have to travel the longest to get their 
requirements. Inactive miles appear to decrease 
with aircraft size after that. Although this metric 
is broken down on a per MDS basis, it could be 
analyzed on a departure airfield basis to discover 
which units have the farthest to travel for 
positioning and depositioning. From these 
results, insights into potential staging 
opportunities could be an area for further 
research.
FUEL
After examination of the effects of Great Circle 
Distance and Load Factors on FEI. the final 
variable that is part of FEI is fuel consumed. An 
examination of fuel consumed against FEI was 
plotted in Figures 6 and 7. To aid in visibility 
for the C-17 plot, three outliers were removed. 
The expected behavior is that as fuel consumed
increases, FEI should decrease. The opposite 
occurs in actuality. There arc two suspected 
reasons for this. First, there is a 78% correlation 
between GCD and fuel consumed and the FEI 
increase associated with increasing GCD 
outweighs the additional fuel burned. Second, 
sorties with higher load factors bum more fuel.
A potential solution to provide greater sensitivity 
to fuel consumed would be to square the fuel 
consumed in the denominator of the FEI 
equation.
When extra fuel is carried on board an aircraft, 
the added weight of that fuel bums additional 
fuel unnecessarily. Due to this cost of carrying 
additional fuel, it is often desired to ensure that 
no more fuel is added to a mission than planned. 
This illustrates the need for a metric that 
represents fueling accuracy as seen in equation 
(11). In addition to reducing the cost to carry 
fuel, it is often desired to have the aircraft fly the 
most fuel efficient flight profile. This is
• 11 '
TABLE 6
FUELING ACCURACY AND FUEL BURN RATIO
Average Fueling Accuracy Average Fuel Bum Ratio
C-17A 97% 1.03
C-5A 95% 0.98
C-5B 98% 0.98
C-5M 100% 1.02
C-130E 100% 1.00
C-130 FI 99% 1.01
C-130J 93% 1.11
KC-10A 96% 0.98
KC-135R 92% 1.00
KC-135T 97% 1.00
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complicated by load factors and distances 
involved. To remove these and other sortie 
specific factors, a contrast could be made 
between a planned fuel burn and the actual fuel 
bum. To drive this behavior, equation (12) 
measures a planned over actual fuel bum ratio. 
The goal of the metric is to maximize the ratio 
by minimizing actual fuel bum.
Differences between planned and actual fuel 
burn are subject to multiple variables. Many of 
these variables are outside of the pilot’s control 
while some can be manipulated. Variables 
outside of the pilot’s control include winds 
different than planned, achievable altitude below 
planned, icing/thunderstorms/turbulence altering 
routings and/or altitude and decreased engine 
performance. Variables within the pilot’s control 
include throttle setting, not Hying planned 
routings and altitudes (not influenced by external 
constraints) and climb/descent profiles. Since 
the ratio of planned fuel burn to actual fuel bum 
does not distinguish between aspects of fuel 
burn that are within the pilot’s locus of control, 
the metric could be unjustly punitive. Despite 
this drawback, the metric does distinguish 
discrepancies from planned fuel bum and drives
behavior to lower fuel bum. Air Mobility 
Command data for average fueling accuracy and 
average fuel bum by aircraft can be seen in Table 6.
From the table, note the high fueling accuracies. 
These high accuracies are due to the way the 
planned ramp fuel is calculated. The Air 
Mobility Command Fuel Data Tracker will set 
the planned ramp fuel equal to actual ramp fuel 
if the ramp fuel deviation reason was outside of 
the pilot’s control. This aids in unjust 
attribution, but skews the data toward the high 
end of accuracy. The fuel bum ratio provides 
little information from an aircraft perspective. It 
might suggest something about the quality of the 
fuel planning or it could be a sign of something 
cultural in that aircraft’s community. The fuel 
burn ratio could be more effectively used by 
comparing organizational units. It could also be 
used to compare pilots.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CITY PAIR ANALYSIS
FHI increased with GC'D, load factor and fuel 
consumed. To get a better understanding of the 
sensitivity of FEI to load factor and fuel 
consumed, a specific city pair was selected.
FIGURE 8
KDOV-ETAR C-17 LOAD FACTORS AND FEI
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FIGURE 9
KDOV-ETAR C-17 FUEL CONSUMED AND FEI
This enabled distance to become constant 
leaving cargo and fuel as the remaining 
variables. Dover to Ramstein was a common 
city pair in the data set with 20 observations. 
Note that managing FEI by city pair might be 
time consuming and effort should be 
concentrated on frequent city pairs. C-17s were 
selected for the analysis to further constrain the 
variables by limiting aircraft type. The results 
can be seen in Figures 8 and 9.
Figure 8 shows how the amount of fuel 
consumed varies for a fixed distance and load 
factor, while Figure 9 shows how the amount of 
cargo varies for a fixed distance and fuel 
consumed. The Figure 8 relationship is useful 
for managers in that it identifies sorties that 
deviate from previous observations based on fuel 
efficiency. The ability to identify sorties that 
exceed a predetermined interval on the 
regression of that city pair could highlight 
outliers in both fuel efficiency and fuel 
inefficiency. In depth analysis of those outliers 
in terms of root cause could expose 
opportunities for greater fuel efficiency. Specific 
aircraft tails or aircrews might repeatedly occur
outside the interval representing the need for 
possible remedial action.
From Figure 8, note the tight scatter of points 
about the simple linear regression. The R for 
this regression is .82. This indicates that load 
factor when constricted by city pair explains 
most of the variability in FEI. Figure 8 also aids 
in understanding that to target an FEI near 1000 
requires an 80% load factor. From Figure 9, 
note that the points have much greater variance 
about the line. The R for this regression is .45. 
This indicates that fuel consumed when 
constricted by city pair explains only 45% of the 
variability in FEI. Taking a vertical slice of 
Figure 8 shows load factor replicates with the 
variance between the data points being explained 
by fuel consumed. Using a band about the 
regression line for a city pair in Figure 8 could 
highlight missions that consume too much or too 
little fuel contrasted against the aggregate. 
Further analysis into those missions could 
potentially highlight fuel savings opportunities.
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INCORPORATING METRICS INTO 
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY FUEL 
EFFICIENCY MODEL
Application of FFJ operationally can drive 
desired behaviors to increase load factors, reduce 
inactive miles and reduce fuel usage. Reducing 
fuel consumption might best be addressed 
through the banding method of the regression 
line in the Dover to Ramstein example. FEI has 
value beyond operational application. To obtain 
the optimal value from FEI, the metric should be 
applied to all of the components of the Aviation 
Industry Fuel Efficiency model. The first 
component of the model requiring the 
application of FEI is strategic decision making. 
FEI should be implemented in both the strategic 
investment and strategic planning components of 
strategic decision making,
From a strategic investment perspective, the FEI 
metric can drive aircraft acquisition 
requirements and allow for innovative paradigm 
shifts. The FEI minimum for several set 
distances can be specified as the requirement. 
Since FEI does not include time as a variable, 
that should be constrained to a set maximum 
when building the requirement to avoid 
solutions that are too slow. FEI also fails to 
address reliability. The C-5 has superior FEI on 
average, but suffers from reliability issues. This 
needs to be addressed when making strategic 
investments such as aircraft acquisition. Larger 
aircraft might be superior in terms of FEI, but 
might suffer mechanically due to their size and 
complexity. Infrastructure improvements 
enhancing load factor potential such as 
pavement strengthening can be assessed based 
upon FEI impact. Strategic airfield 
improvements could result in increased cargo 
flow and more efficient operations. Ranking 
airfield improvement projects by FEI impact can 
be an important factor when considering 
prioritization.
Beyond strategic investment, FEI could be 
extremely useful in strategic planning. FEI and
inactive miles would be very useful for the 
determination of aircraft basing and staging 
locations. Those metrics would also be very 
useful from a theory of constraints perspective 
by highlighting the least efficient aircraft and 
mission pairings. Automatically calculating the 
FEI planning metric once an aircraft has been 
assigned to the mission and highlighting poor 
FEIs and inactive miles could provide planning 
and aircraft allocation functions immediate 
feedback for correction. Individual planners and 
aircraft allocators can be held accountable using 
FEI and inactive miles as performance metrics. 
Beyond individuals, organizational goals can be 
established regarding both the FEI and inactive 
miles.
Implementation of the FEI should extend beyond 
the firm when the FEI is dependent upon other 
firms in the supply chain. Suppliers performing 
functions such as warehousing and distribution 
that are tied to air mobility should be provided 
information on their FEI impact. In addition, 
strategic partnering should be encouraged to 
enhance load factors. Alliances should be 
examined that offer the greatest potential to 
increase the FEI. Shared investments on 
information technology, automated identification 
and tracking and cargo distribution equipment 
might offer FEI improvements that justify the 
acquisition. Suppliers need to be properly 
rewarded for their investments to enhance FEI.
Strategic decision making and supply chain fuel 
efficiency can be greatly improved through the 
use of the FEI. Yet, there are areas of 
improvement in FEI that can only be achieved 
by those operational workers executing the 
process. To reap those benefits, FEI needs to be 
embedded into organizational culture.
Attempting to embed a metric into 
organizational culture and simultaneously using 
the metric as a tool for accountability is difficult. 
The problem is that individuals tend to rebel 
against punitive metrics. For acceptance, it is 
preferred to use the metric in a positive role until 
it becomes accepted as part of the organization.
It is important to include the metric when
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measuring operations at every level. Obtaining 
leadership support for the metric is essential.
FEI needs to be presented at senior level 
meetings and included in organizational goals. 
Finally, FEI should be part of the reward 
structure for promotion for factors within the 
individual’s control. This could include 
individual awards for sustained high FEI 
performance to highlighting the metric during 
promotion discussions.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
The Aviation Industry Fuel Efficiency model 
presents a framework for transforming fuel 
efficiency into a sustained competitive 
advantage. This is achieved through the use of 
the dynamic capabilities of strategic decision 
making and alliancing. In addition to those 
dynamic capabilities, the model recommends 
ingraining fuel efficiency into the organizational 
culture. To assist the manager in implementing 
the model, the FEI was introduced. The FEI 
drives desired behaviors to increase load factors, 
decrease inactive miles and reduce fuel 
consumed. Other metrics were suggested to 
further assist the manager in improving fuel 
efficiency behaviors to include load factors, 
inactive miles per sortie, fueling accuracy and 
fuel burn ratio. It is important to measure load 
factors from both a weight and cube perspective, 
to obtain a better understanding of the efficiency 
of operations.
Measuring FEI operationally can drive behaviors 
toward increased fuel efficiency, but application 
of the FEI to the model is where a firm can 
leverage much greater fuel efficiency benefits. 
Extending the FEI to strategic decision making, 
supply chain partners and the organizational 
culture will allow the firm’s fuel efficiency 
focused resources to not be easily imitated.
There arc certain risks associated with greater 
fuel efficiency integration within the supply 
chain and strategic fuel efficiency investments. 
These risks need to be thoroughly analyzed.
There are also risks to not integrating or not 
investing in an environment of rising fuel prices.
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Following a fuel efficiency strategy will make 
the firm and the Finn’s supply chain less 
susceptible to rising fuel prices. A fuel 
efficiency strategy will also increase a firm’s 
ability to compete on price.
The FEI ties together all of the components of 
the model. It enables individual, organizational, 
corporate, supply chain and industry goals to 
align. This common sense of purpose can only 
be achieved if the metric is valued equally. FEI 
could support aircraft manufacturers, 
distribution centers, command information 
systems, planning systems and allocation. Much 
as a low cost retailer is less susceptible to 
economic downturns, a fuel efficient firm in the 
aviation industry is less susceptible to fuel price 
increases. A fuel efficiency strategy is a risk 
reduction strategy with opportunities for expert 
practitioners to obtain a sustained competitive 
advantage.
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3. All graphics MUST be saved in one of these formats: TIFF or JPG.
4. Tables and figures are NOT to be included unless directly referred to in the body of the manuscript.
5. Please remember that JTM is printed in black and white. Use of color and/or shading should be 
avoided.
6. For accepted manuscripts, each table and/or figure should be printed on a separate page and included 
at the end after References with the Table Title at the top in 12 point, upper case and bold.
7. Placement of tables and figures in the manuscript should be indicated as follows:
Table or Figure (#) About Here
EQUATIONS, CITATIONS, REFERENCES, ENDNOTES, APPENDIXES, ETC.
1. Equations are placed on a separate line with a blank line both above and below, and numbered in 
parentheses, Hush right. Examples:
y = c + ax + bx 
y = a + lx + 2x + 3x + ax
2. References within the text should include the author’s last name and year of publication enclosed in 
parentheses, c.g. (Wilson, 2004; Manrodt and Rutner, 2004). For more than one cite in the same 
location, references should be in chronological order. For more than one cite in the same year, 
alphabetize by author name, such as (Wilson, 2001; Mandrodt, 2002; Rutner, 2002; Wilson, 2003). If 
practical, place the citation just ahead of a punctuation mark. If the author’s name is used within the 
text sentence, just place the year of publication in parentheses, c.g., “According to Manrodt and Rutner 
(2003) ...,”. For multiple authors, use up to three names in the citation. With four or more authors, use 
the lead author and et al., (Wilson et al., 2004). References from the Internet should contain the site 
name, author/organization if available, date the page/site w as created, date page/site was accessed, and 
complete web addresses sufficient to find the cited work.
3. Endnotes may be used when necessary. Create endnotes in 10-point font and place them in a separate 
section at the end of the text before References. (1,2, etc.). Note: Endnotes should be explanatory in 
nature and not for reference purposes. Endnotes should NOT be created in Microsoft Insert Footnotes/ 
Endnotes system. The Endnotes section should be titled in 12 point, uppercase and bolded.
4. All references should be in block style. Hanging indents are not to be used.
5. Appendices follow the body of the text and references and each should be headed by a title of 
APPENDIX (#) in caps and 12 Point, and bolded.
6. The list of references cited in the manuscript should immediately follow the body of the text in 
alphabetical order, with the lead author’s surname first and the year of publication following all author 
names. The Reference Section should be headed with REFERENCES in caps, bolded, and in 12 point 
font. Work by the same author with the same year of publication should be distinguished by lower case
Journal of Transportation Management
letters after the date (e.g., 1996a). For author names that repeat, in the same order, in subsequent 
cites, substitute a .5 inch underline for each name that repeats. Authors’ initials should have a space 
between the initials, e.g., Smith, Jr., H. E., Timon, III., P. S. R., etc. A blank line should separate each 
reference in the list. Do not number references.
7. All references to journals, books, etc., are italicized, NOT underlined. Examples are as follows:
Journal Article:
Pohlen, Terrance L. (2003), “A Framework for Evaluating Supply Chain Performance,” Journal of 
Transportation Management, 14(2): 1-21.
Book Chapter:
Manrodt, Karl (2003), “Drivers of Logistics Excellence: Implications for Carriers,” In J. W. Wilson 
(Ed.), Logistics and Transportation Research Yearbook 2003 (pp. 126-154) Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Book:
Coyle, John J., Bardi, Edward J., and Novaek, RobertA. (2004), Transportation, 6th ed., Cincinnati, 
OH: South-Western College Publishing.
Website:
Wilson, J. W. (2003), “Adapting to the Threat of Global Terrorism: Reinventing Your Supply 
Chain,” [On-line]. Available: http//:georgiasouthern.edu/coba/centers/lit/threat.doc. Created: 11/01/ 
02, Accessed: 11/12/03.
MANUSCRIPT SAMPLE
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE
Terrance L. Pohlen, University of North Texas
ABSTRACT
Managers require measures spanning multiple enterprises to increase supply chain competitiveness 
and to increase the value delivered to the end-customer. Despite the need for supply chain metrics, 
there is little evidence that any firms arc successfully measuring and evaluating inter-firm 
performance. Existing measures continue to capture intrafirm performance and focus on traditional 
measures. The lack of a framework to simultaneously measure and translate inter-firm performance 
into value creation has largely contributed to this situation. This article presents a framework that 
overcomes these shortcomings by measuring performance across multiple firms and translating 
supply chain performance into shareholder value.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to measure supply chain performance remains an elusive goal for managers in most 
companies. Few have implemented supply chain management or have visibility of performance 
across multiple companies (Supply Chain Solutions, 1998; Keeler et al., 1999; Simatupang and
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Sridharan, 2002). Supply chain management itself lacks a widely accepted definition (Akkermans, 
1999), and many managers substitute the term for logistics or supplier management (Lambert and 
Pohlen, 2001). As a result, performance measurement tends to be functionally or internally focused 
and does not capture supply chain performance (Gilmour, 1999; Supply Chain Management, 200 I) 
At best, existing measures only capture how immediate upstream suppliers and downstream 
customers drive performance within a single firm.
Table 1 about here
Developing and Costing Performance Measures
ABC is a technique for assigning the direct and indirect resources of a firm to the activities 
consuming the resources and subsequently tracing the cost of performing these activities to the 
products, customers, or supply chains consuming the activities (La Londe and Pohlen, 1996). An 
activity-based approach increases costing accuracy by using multiple drivers to assign costs whereas 
traditional cost accounting frequently relies on a very limited number of allocation bases.
y = d: - lax - >::
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